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 In this dissertation, I examine tax incentives in corporate acquisitions. Reported tax losses 
or net operating losses (NOLs) under the United States (U.S.) income tax law have grown 
considerably in recent years. Yet, there is limited empirical evidence on whether target firms’ NOL 
carry-forward (NOLC), which is a potential tax asset, affects merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activity. I re-examine two open empirical questions in the literature for which there is limited or 
no empirical evidence. First, does the acquirer compensate the target’s shareholders for the target’s 
NOLC? I predict and find that the association between the target’s NOLC and acquisition premium 
is increasing in the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. Second, does the target’s NOLC affect how the 
acquisition is financed? Consistent with capital structure theory on the substitutability of debt and 
non-debt tax shields, I find that the probability of debt financing is relatively lower in deals in 
which the target has an NOLC. In accordance with the Scholes-Wolfson framework, of “all taxes, 
all parties, and all costs”, a key insight in this dissertation is that the tax and non-tax attributes of 
the target and acquirer firm interact to determine the available tax incentive and thus the optimal 
level of tax-planning. 
 This dissertation also provides new insight into the distortionary effect of tax policy. 
NOLC-related tax incentives in corporate acquisitions are governed by Section 382 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. §382 imposes a loss limitation on firms’ tax attributes following an ownership 
change, effectively reducing the net present value (NPV) of the tax assets. Empirically, I document 
that the uncertainty inherent in the applicability of §382 rules increases the likelihood that a deal 
is cancelled. In addition, I find that §382 is an important determinant in the medium of exchange 
and that the applicability of loss limitation rules is a plausible explanation for the well-documented 
aggregate trend in the decline in the propensity of all-stock deals. My findings suggest that §382 
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creates serious and unintended distortions in the merger decision, the effects of which are 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Summary of Thesis 
 A central question in corporate finance is whether tax incentives are of first-order 
importance in corporate decisions. In this dissertation, I examine the M&A setting and provide 
new evidence on whether and to what extent taxes influence capital structure and corporate 
investment decisions, and consequently firm value.  
 Prior work that has examined the effect of taxes on M&A decisions has largely concluded 
that while the acquiring firm’s tax status significantly influences acquisition structure and pricing, 
the tax attributes of the target firm, particularly its federal net operating loss carry-forward 
(NOLC), do not matter in most corporate acquisitions (e.g., Auerbach and Reishus 1988c; Erickson 
1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2005). The inability to establish this link empirically suggests that acquirers 
forgo potentially valuable tax assets. This is puzzling because it goes against conventional wisdom 
and practitioner experience, and because it suggests that costly legislative efforts to prevent loss 
trafficking may be unnecessary. 
 The percentage of U.S. public firms that report an NOLC, as well as the amount of NOLC 
reported, has increased significantly over the last few decades.1 In their review of the empirical tax 
literature, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) speculate that NOLCs were relatively small in earlier study 
periods, and that recent growth in these potential tax assets may provide an opportunity to detect 
an effect that prior studies were not able to. Erickson (1998) estimates that conditional on reporting 
a positive federal NOLC, the median target firm in his sample that was acquired between 1985 and 
                                                          
1 Using a stratified sample of tax return data from the population of C corporations for tax years 1994-2004, Cooper 
and Knittel (2006; 2010) find that approximately 50% of firms report an NOLC and that the average gross amount 
reported tripled from $100 million in 1993 to $300 million in 2004. In a more recent study, Heitzman and Lester 
(2021) find that between 2010 and 2015 nearly 90% of the largest public U.S. firms reported a federal NOLC with a 
mean (median) gross value of $474 ($99) million.  
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1988 reported $2.6 million. The corresponding estimate in my sample for acquisitions announced 
between 1995 and 2016 is $42.6 million. The significant increase in reported tax losses provide an 
opportunity to not only revise prior beliefs, but also to produce new evidence on whether, to what 
extent, and how NOLCs matter in corporate acquisitions. 
 In examining tax incentives associated with firms’ tax attributes, the M&A setting differs 
significantly from other investment (such as capital expenditures) due to the imposition of loss 
limitation rules under Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code as amended under the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. §382 allows for the target’s NOLC to transfer to the acquirer, but it imposes a limit 
on the amount of the NOLC that can be used in each subsequent tax year. The annual §382 limit, 
referred to as the loss limit, is deal-specific and can substantially reduce the post-acquisition value 
of the NOLC.  
 I begin by re-examining two anomalies in the literature. The literature on taxes and asset 
pricing examines the association between NOLCs and acquisition pricing. In a seminal study, 
Hayn (1989) documents that for a sample of acquisitions announced between 1970 and 1985, 
acquirer and target firm acquisition announcement returns are positively associated with targets’ 
short-lived federal NOLC (i.e., the portion that will expire within 2 years). She concludes that the 
transfer of the NOLC increases the probability that the future tax benefit of the NOLC will be 
realized thereby creating shareholder-wealth for both parties. Subsequent studies, unable to 
document this effect in more recent samples of acquisitions, conclude that the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 introduced stricter restrictions on acquiring firms’ ability to utilize acquired NOLCs post-
acquisition and that this has largely eliminated the potential tax benefit (e.g., Henning, Shaw, and 
Stock 2000; Chiang, Stammerjohan, and Englebrecht 2014).  
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 My first set of tests focus on acquisition premium and announcement returns. I predict a 
positive association between the target’s NOLC and acquisition premium that is conditional on the 
acquirer’s expectation of future income, as captured by its marginal tax rate (MTR).2 I estimate 
that a fully taxable acquirer (with an MTR of 35%) pays a premium of $0.031 per dollar of the 
target’s gross NOLC, on average. By contrast, I do not observe a significant premium in deals in 
which the acquirer is not taxable.  
 The imposition of §382 loss-limitation rules reduces the NPV of NOLCs in practically all 
acquisitions. Thus, the transfer of an NOLC from the target to the acquirer creates shareholder-
wealth only if the post-acquisition value of the tax-benefit to the acquirer exceeds the pre-
acquisition value to the target. I rely on financial accounting disclosure to induce cross-sectional 
variation in the NOLC tax-benefit previously capitalized in target firms’ price. Accounting 
Standards Codification Section 740 (ASC 740) requires managers to estimate the future realization 
of an NOLC based on expectations of future income and to offset the tax-effected amount of the 
NOLC recorded in the deferred tax asset with a valuation allowance (VA) to the extent that it is 
“more likely than not” that the tax asset will expire unrealized. In an efficient market, the disclosure 
of a VA leads to a downward price adjustment (e.g., Kumar and Visvanathan 2003).  
 In deals in which the acquirer is fully taxable (with an MTR of 35%) and the target has not 
fully offset its NOLC with a VA, I find that both the acquirer and the target firm generate 
significantly negative acquisition announcement abnormal returns. In addition, for this subsample 
of deals, I estimate an acquisition premium of $0.126 per dollar of the target’s gross NOLC. I 
interpret this as the acquirer partially compensating the target shareholders for the loss of the tax-
                                                          
2 I define premium as the excess of the offer price over target’s trading price, scaled by the target’s trading price. 
Trading price is measured four weeks prior to the transaction announcement date. 
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benefit that the target firm would have realized absent the merger. These results suggest that loss 
in the value of the target’s NOLC due to §382 is shared between the two parties. 
 In deals in which the acquirer is fully taxable (with an MTR of 35%) and the target has 
fully offset its NOLC with a VA, I estimate an acquisition premium of $0.026 per dollar of the 
target’s gross NOLC, suggesting that the acquirer obtains the NOLC at a steep discount. This is 
corroborated by the acquirer generating a significantly positive acquisition announcement 
abnormal return. Though the announcement return to the target is insignificant, I find that a benefit 
accrues to the target via a reversal of the VA discount in the months leading up to the acquisition. 
The transfer of the tax asset to an acquirer that is better able to use it creates shareholder-wealth 
for both parties.  
 Taken together, my findings suggest that there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
valuation of NOLCs and that the valuation-allowance provides a credible signal of the NOLC’s 
pre-acquisition capitalization.  
 A second stream of literature builds on capital structure theory (Miller and Modgiliani 
1958; 1963), and examines the effect of target firms’ NOLC on the method of acquisition 
financing. The trade-off theory predicts that interest deductions and other investment-related tax 
shields are substitutable (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). In the acquisition setting, this implies that 
the acquirer trades-off the present value of the target’s NOLC against potential interest deductions 
from financing the acquisition with debt. Prior studies, unable to establish this empirically, have 
concluded that acquirers’ willingness to forgo the potential tax-benefit suggests that target firms’ 
NOLCs do not matter in corporate acquisitions (e.g., Erickson 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2005).  
 My second set of tests focus on the trade-off theory. I predict that the probability of at least 
partial debt financing is relatively lower in acquisitions in which the target has an NOLC. My 
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estimate suggests that the target having an NOLC decreases the relative probability of a partially 
debt-financed acquisition by 6.4 percentage points. I conduct numerous sensitivity tests. First, 
because the trade-off theory is most applicable to tax constrained firms, I condition the test on the 
acquirer’s marginal tax rate. I find that the NOLC-debt trade-off is increasing in the acquirer’s 
MTR. Second, restricting the sample to cash-for-stock taxable deals, I find that, conditional on the 
target having an NOLC, the probability of a 100% debt-financed acquisition is 33 percentage 
points lower relative to a deal that is financed 100% with internal cash.  
 I further document that the NOLC-debt trade-off is strongest in the presence of financing 
frictions. During the 2007-2008 credit crisis, the supply curve for bank credit shifted inward and 
the composition of corporate debt shifted from private to public. By early 2008, the cost of public 
debt exceeded the cost of new bank loans (De Fiore and Uhlig 2015). I find that, conditional on 
making an acquisition, firms that relied on bond markets were significantly more likely to choose 
a target with an NOLC. This provides additional support for the theory that debt and non-debt tax-
shields are substitutable. 
 In my third set of tests, I examine the effect of loss limitation rules imposed under §382 of 
the Internal Revenue Code on the probability of deal completion. The loss-limit is computed as 
the fair market value (MV) of the target corporation on the date of ownership change multiplied 
by the federal long-term tax-exempt rate (FLTR).3 The applicable loss-limit is not known with 
certainty on the date of the offer which precedes the ownership change date. The implication is 
that the loss-limit may change between the date of the offer and the date that the transaction closes. 
My tests provide several insights.  
                                                          
3 The federal long-term tax-exempt rate (FLTR), published monthly by the IRS, is intended to mimic the rate of long-
term municipal bonds. 
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 I document that deals are less likely to be completed if the loss limit becomes unfavorable 
and that this effect is more pronounced in deals in which the target has a larger NOLC. In a deal 
in which the target has an NOLC of $50 ($100) million, a drop in the loss limit reduces the 
probability of deal completion by 15 (20) percentage points. These estimates correspond roughly 
with the mean (median) deal in the sample, suggesting that the economic effect is large. By 
contrast, an increase in the loss limit does not significantly affect the likelihood of completion, 
suggesting that changes in the loss limit are asymmetric with respect to increases and decreases. 
 I then document two ways in which the acquiring firm can offset the negative tax 
consequences of a drop in the loss limit. First, using data on public bond-issuance, I document that 
the effect of a drop in the loss-limit on the likelihood of deal completion is offset if the acquirer 
issues additional debt between the offer and completion dates. This provides further evidence that 
tax shields are substitutable and that the NOLC-debt trade-off occurs in private and public debt 
markets. Second, I document acquirers’ incentive to time the completion of the deal to coincide 
with a more favorable loss-limit. Specifically, I find that deals are more likely to close within 1-
month of the initial offer if the initial loss-limit is relatively large.  
 In my fourth set of tests, I examine the effect of §382 loss limitations on acquirers’ tax 
attributes. Under §382, the triggering event is a change in ownership. While this is typically always 
triggered for the target firm, it is only sometimes triggered for the acquiring firm. The §382 loss 
limit is imposed on the acquirer’s NOLC only if the acquirer finances the acquisition with its own 
stock and the value of the stock is large enough to trigger a significant ownership change. 
Accordingly, an acquirer has discretion as to whether the §382 rules will be applicable.  
 Empirically, I document that acquirers with NOLCs are less likely to pay with stock if there 
is potential for triggering an ownership change. Conditional on paying with stock, I find that deals 
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are more likely to be cancelled if the loss limit drops between the announcement and closing dates. 
An increase in the loss limit has no material effect. Finally, I document that the previously studied 
aggregate trend in the decline of all-stock deals in the early 2000s coincides with an increase in 
the percent of acquirers with NOLCs. This suggests that the tax disincentive for stock payment is 
economically large.  
1.2 Contribution to Academic Literature and Tax Policy 
 This dissertation contributes to several streams of literature. My study fits best within the 
literature on the role of tax incentives in corporate acquisitions. In accordance with the Scholes-
Wolfson paradigm, of “all taxes, all parties, and all costs”, a key insight in my paper is that the tax 
and non-tax attributes of the target and acquirer interact in determining acquisition premium and 
financing, and the probability of deal completion. My findings provide insight into the “black box” 
of tax planning, and produce evidence on how “parties coordinate and share the benefits of tax 
planning” (Dyreng and Maydew 2018, 6).  
 My findings provide new insight into the debate on the value-relevance of accounting for 
income taxes. In their review of the literature, Graham, Raedy, and Shackelford (2013; 431) note 
that the extant prior evidence, based on relatively small samples, produces mixed results and this 
limits external validity. The authors assert that “additional research is warranted to determine 
whether the market prices the deferred tax accounts, including the valuation allowance”. Like 
Dhaliwal et al. (2013), I document that valuation allowance (VA) disclosures are credible. 
Additionally, like Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018), I document that federal NOLCs are 
capitalized in stock prices. My key contribution, however, is at the intersection of these two 
findings. I document that the amount of NOLC capitalized in stock prices varies cross-sectionally 
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with the VA. This evidence is of relevance to future studies examining the effect of taxes on asset 
prices, a topic in which accounting research has stagnated (Dyreng and Maydew 2018).  
 My findings also shed new light on capital structure literature. The trade-off theory predicts 
that debt and non-debt tax shields are substitutable (e.g., Miller and Modgiliani 1958, 1963; 
DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). Yet, studies have been unable to establish that acquirers trade-off 
acquisition financing-related interest deductions with the tax benefits of acquired NOLCs (e.g., 
Erickson 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2005). Although puzzling, this result is consistent with studies that 
historically have not been able to establish an association between tax status and debt policy in 
various settings. This had led some to question the validity of the trade-off theory (e.g., Myers 
1984). Fama (2011) remains skeptical and argues that “the big open challenge in corporate finance 
is to produce evidence on how taxes affect … optimal financing decisions.” More recent studies, 
using exogenous variation in tax status, have been able to establish the effect of tax status on debt 
policy (e.g., Doidge and Dyck 2013; Heider and Ljungqvist 2014). Nonetheless, my setting differs 
from these studies in that it examines acquisition-related debt financing and taxes are often 
considered to be of “third-order” importance in investment decisions (Myers et al. 1998).4  
 Finally, my study contributes to a large literature that examines the determinants of the 
choice of payment in mergers and acquisitions. The literature has recognized various important 
determinants, such as asymmetric information, agency costs, capital structure, and the capital gains 
tax liability. Despite these factors, there is still considerable unexplained variance in the 
determinants of the medium of exchange (e.g., Boone, Lie, and Liu 2014). I provide a previously 
unexplored explanation for the well-documented trend beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
in which the propensity of all-stock deals declined in favor of all-cash deals. I find that this trend 
                                                          
4 Because M&A debt financing is an incremental debt policy decision, my study does not suffer from the well-known 
endogenous nature of marginal tax rates and debt policy discussed by Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998). 
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coincides with the increase in the percent of firms reporting an NOLC, suggesting that acquirers’ 
tax incentives significantly affect the method of payment in corporate acquisitions. Though this 
tax explanation has received little attention in the literature, my evidence suggests that its 
contribution to the decline in all-stock deals is large.  
 From a policy standpoint, it is important to understand not only whether a policy has had 
its intended effect, but also whether it has had unintended consequences. §382 is highly 
controversial with critics arguing that it imposes significant costs on corporations. In implementing 
§382, congress intended to deter tax-motivated acquisitions.5 Such transactions are undesirable 
because they violate the principle of tax neutrality, which holds that taxes should neither induce 
nor impede investment. Paradoxically, my evidence suggests that loss-limitation rules create at 
least two potential distortions in the merger decision. 
 First, the requirement that the loss-limit be computed as of the date of ownership change 
creates uncertainty on the actual applicable loss-limit and this penalizes an acquirer that engages 
in tax-planning within the spirit of the tax law. The acquirer is forced to either time the closing of 
the deal to coincide with a favorable loss limit, or to incur additional costs associated with debt-
issuance to re-balance its optimal tax plan. Forgoing these strategies, a drop in the loss-limit 
impedes investment.  
 A second, and potentially costlier, unintended consequence of §382 is that it reduces the 
acquirer’s incentive to pay with stock. Deals with stock consideration can potentially trigger an 
ownership change in the acquirer’s stock and thereby impose loss limitation rules on the acquirer’s 
NOLC. This is particularly costly if the acquirer has a large NOLC and the applicable loss limit 
                                                          
5 As defined in §269 of the Internal Revenue Code, a tax-motivated acquisition is an acquisition that is made to evade 
or avoid income tax. The most common form, often referred to as “loss trafficking”, occurs if a profitable firm acquires 
a loss firm for the purpose of obtaining the tax-benefit of the loss firm’s NOLC.  
10 
 
declines. My finding that the aggregate trend in the decline of all-stock deals coincides the increase 
in the percent of acquirers with NOLCs suggests that the §382 distortion on investment is 
potentially large.   
 Although Congress has long concluded that taxes motivate acquisitions, my evidence does 
not support this. My finding of an asymmetric effect of loss limit changes on deal completion is 
counter to the tax-motivation for acquisitions.  
1.3 Thesis Organization 
 This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the treatment of NOLCs for 
tax and financial reporting purposes and the tax laws applicable in corporate acquisitions. Chapter 
3 provides a literature review of studies that examine the effect of NOLCs on acquisition pricing. 
Chapter 4 provides a review of the tax and non-tax benefits and costs in the acquisition of free-
standing C corporations within the Scholes-Wolfson framework of tax planning. Chapter 5 
develops my two main hypotheses on the effect of the target’s NOLC on acquisition premium and 
financing. Chapter 6 discusses the research design and sample selection procedure. Chapter 7 
reports results from the empirical tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. Chapter 8 provides a discussion and 
tests of the effect of loss limitation rules on the timing and completion of deals. Chapter 9 provides 
additional tests related to the acquirer’s NOLC. Finally, Chapter 10 summarizes the main 








Chapter 2. Institutional Details 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter discusses the institutional details on net operating losses. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 
discuss the treatment of net operating losses for tax and financial reporting purposes, respectively. 
In section 2.4 I discuss the tax implication of net operating losses in mergers and acquisitions. 
Section 2.5 concludes with a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 The Treatment of Net Operating Losses under the Federal Tax Law  
 The U.S. tax system treats gains and losses asymmetrically. If a corporation’s taxable 
income in a given year exceeds its allowable deductions, then the corporation is taxed on its net 
income at the statutory corporate tax rate. If net income is negative, the corporation does not 
receive an immediate refund equal to the tax value of its loss. Instead, section 172 of the Internal 
Revenue Code stipulates that the corporation can either carry back the loss to a preceding tax year 
and obtain a tax refund if it had taxable income in that year and paid income taxes, or carry forward 
the loss to offset taxable income in a subsequent tax year. A loss that is carried forward does not 
earn interest, cannot be adjusted for inflation, and may expire unused.  
 The NOL carryover rules have evolved over the years. As of 1981, tax losses could be 
carried back three years and forward 15 years. The rules in place during the majority of my sample 
period, which were implemented in 1997 under the Tax Relief Act of 1997, allow losses to be 
carried back two years and forward 20 years.6 Any NOL that is not used within the carryover 
period permanently expires.7  
                                                          
6 The rules were overhauled in 2017 under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) such that NOLs generated in tax years 
after 2017 can no longer be carried back and instead they can be carried forward indefinitely. Moreover, while 
historically firms could use NOLs to reduce 100% of their taxable income, the new rules limit the deduction of NOLs 
to 80% of taxable income.  
7 In recessionary periods, Congress has enacted legislation to temporarily extend the carry back window (Dobridge 
2016). The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 allowed a five-year carry-back of losses incurred in 2001 
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2.3 The Treatment of Net Operating Losses for Financial Reporting Purposes 
 If a firm incurs a tax loss in the current year, and it does not have sufficient taxable income 
in prior years to carry the loss back, it records the future tax benefit of the NOL in its deferred tax 
asset equal to the amount of the gross NOL multiplied by the statutory corporate tax rate.8 Due to 
differences between financial reporting and tax rules, the gross and tax-effected (or net) NOL may 
not be perfectly correlated. The two measures can differ, for instance, due to the different treatment 
of write-offs and discontinued operations.9  
 Once recorded, the nominal dollar amount of the tax-effected NOL in the deferred tax asset 
cannot later be adjusted. However, provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
109 (SFAS No. 109), now part of Accounting Standards Codification Section 740 (ASC 740), 
require firms to offset the reported tax-effected amount of the NOL carry-forward with a valuation 
allowance (VA) to the extent that it is “more likely than not” that the tax asset will expire 
unrealized. Recording a VA requires that managers estimate the future realization of the NOLC 
based on expectations of future income. GAAP lists four sources of income that managers should 
consider in estimating the valuation allowance (Graham et al. 2012): 1) future reversals of existing 
taxable temporary differences, 2) future taxable income, 3) taxable income in carryback periods, 
and 4) the existence of tax-planning strategies. 
2.4 The Treatment of Net Operating Losses in Mergers and Acquisitions  
 The medium of exchange (or method of payment) determines the tax status of the 
acquisition structure (i.e., taxable versus tax-free to target firm shareholders). The IRS presumes 
all acquisitions to be taxable unless certain conditions are met. Generally, for an acquisition to be 
                                                          
and 2002. The Worker, Homeowner, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 allowed a five-year carry-back of losses 
incurred in 2008 and 2009. 
8 Firms typically report the gross NOL carryforward in the tax footnotes to the annual 10-k report. 
9 See Auerbach and Poterba (1987) for further discussion. 
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classified as tax-free under Section 368(a)(1)(B), 100% of the consideration used in the acquisition 
must be voting stock (either common or preferred) of the acquirer with the exception of cash paid 
in lieu of fractional shares. Additionally, the acquirer must obtain 80% control of the target 
(Scholes et al. 2014, 417-418).10 
 Appendix A summarizes the tax effects of the five basic structures used in the acquisition 
of freestanding C corporations.11 This appendix and the related discussion are adapted from 
Scholes et al. (2014) and from Erickson (2000). The acquisition of a C corporation can be 
structured as either a taxable asset purchase or a tax-free stock purchase.12 In some transactions, 
the acquirer and target can jointly make a section 338(h)(10) election to treat a tax-free stock 
purchase as a taxable asset purchase for tax purposes.  
 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) introduced important changes to the tax treatment 
of acquisitions. Prior to the TRA 86, all five structures were commonly used in acquisitions of 
free-standing C corporations and the tax status of the acquisition determined whether the target’s 
NOLC transferred to the acquirer. An NOLC generally always transferred to the acquirer in tax-
free stock acquisitions, but only sometimes in taxable cash acquisitions. Post TRA 86 acquisitions 
of free-standing C corporations are generally structured as either tax-free stock acquisitions, tax-
free asset acquisitions, or taxable stock acquisitions without a §338 election. Although they differ 
with respect to target shareholders’ capital gains tax liability, all three structures allow for the 
targets’ NOLC to transfer to the acquirer subject to restrictions (Scholes et al. 2014).13 
                                                          
10 Mixed cash-stock offers can be treated as either taxable or tax-free depending on the portion of each type of payment 
and other characteristics of the deal (Scholes et al. 2014). 
11 The costs and benefits of these acquisition structures have evolved over time due to regulation and market forces. I 
provide a detailed discussion in Chapter 4. 
12 Unless stated otherwise, I use the terms “tax status”, “taxable”, and “tax-free” throughout this dissertation to refer 
to the acquisition’s tax implication to the target firm’s shareholders.  
13 Some exceptions apply. For instance, §269 of the Internal Revenue Code (the successor to section 129 initially 
enacted by congress under the Revenue Act of 1943) disallows any tax benefit obtained in an acquisition if the principal 
purpose of the acquisition is evasion or avoidance of federal income tax. 
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 Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code restricts the use of a corporation’s tax losses if 
the corporation undergoes an ownership change. Although initially enacted by congress in 1954, the 
current version of §382 was implemented under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86). An ownership 
change is defined as any increase greater than 50 percentage points in the corporation’s stock over a three-
year period by shareholders who own 5 percent for more of the corporation’s stock. If an ownership 
change is deemed to have occurred, then §382 limits the acquirer’s ability to utilize the target’s 
pre-ownership change NOLC to offset post ownership change income.14 In each post-acquisition 
tax year, the acquirer can use the target’s NOLC to offset taxable income subject to the lesser of i) 
the target’s NOLC and ii) the fair market value (MV) of the target at the time of ownership change 
multiplied by the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate (FLTR).15 Taking into account the 
annual loss-limit, any amount of the NOLC that cannot be used within 20-year carryforward period 
permanently expires.16  
 
 
                                                          
14 The intended goal of §382 is to limit the use of loss carryovers following an ownership change to the amount of 
losses that would have been used by the loss corporation absent an ownership change. In other words, following an 
ownership change, the loss corporation’s NOLC should only be allowed to offset income from the loss corporation’s 
pool of capital existing on the date of ownership change. For example, if the loss corporation’s shareholders hold 10% 
of the shares in the combined entity, the loss corporation’s NOLC should offset only 10% of taxable income in the 
combined entity. See Hoenig (2014) for further discussion. 
15 §382 requires the use of an adjusted rate which equals the highest FLTR for the three-calendar month period ending 
with the month of the ownership change. The §382 formula attempts to impute a rate at which the loss corporation 
could have used its NOLs absent an ownership change if the corporation had instead sold all its assets and used the 
proceeds to purchase treasury bonds (Hoenig 2014).  
16 The discussion in this section provides a simplified case of a §382 limitation. There are additional factors that may 
affect the limitation amount. First, the §382 limitation may be increased if the target has net unrealized built-in gains. 
Second, in computing the target’s fair market value, all class of shares and the related control rights must to be 
considered. Third, the above discussion assumes that only one §382 limitation applies and that it is triggered by the 
acquisition. In reality, an NOL may be subject to multiple §382 limitations as a result of prior ownership changes due 
not only to acquisitions, but also equity-issuance and recapitalization. Complete information on all prior ownership 
changes is necessary because if an NOL is subject to multiple §382 limitations, the most restrictive limitation applies. 
Finally, Section 382(c)(1) contains a ‘continuity of business enterprise’ requirement which requires that the new 
corporation continue the historic business of the old loss corporation at all times during the two-year period beginning 
on the ownership change date. If this requirement is not met, then the §382 loss limit is reduced to zero and applied 




 A tax loss, referred to as a net operating loss (NOL) under the United States (U.S.) Federal 
income tax law, arises when a business has more allowable tax deductions than it has taxable 
income. NOL carryover provisions in the Internal Revenue Code allow taxpayers to either carry 
back a loss to a preceding tax year and obtain a tax refund, if the taxpayer had taxable income in 
that year and paid income taxes, or to carry forward a loss to reduce taxable income in a subsequent 
tax year. To prevent businesses from trafficking in tax losses (i.e., acquiring a firm for the sole 
purpose of obtaining its NOLC), the tax code has rules that either eliminate the NOLC entirely or 

















Chapter 3. The Pricing of Net Operating Losses in Acquisitions – Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the literature on the pricing of target firms’ net operating losses in 
corporate acquisitions. A target firm’s NOLC is valuable to a potential acquirer to the extent that 
the NOLC reduces the acquirer’s future tax burden. In section 3.2, I discuss six studies that 
examine the pricing of targets’ NOLCs in acquisitions. Section 3.3 concludes with a summary of 
the chapter. 
3.2 Literature Review   
 The traditional approach to examining the valuation of a tax attribute in M&A transactions 
is to estimate a cross-sectional regression of target and/or acquirer acquisition announcement 
returns or acquisition premium. It is well-documented in the literature that announcement returns 
and premium are conditional on the target’s pre-acquisition market capitalization. One instance in 
which a positive price response occurs is when 1) the target’s price has previously been discounted 
by the market due to uncertainty relating to the target’s future cash flows, and 2) the market 
anticipates that the merger will lead to synergies that are greater than if the target were to be 
acquired by the average acquiring firm (e.g., Laamanen 2007). By contrast, a negative premium 
or announcement return indicates that the pre-acquisition amount capitalized exceeds the post-
acquisition value of the attribute. This does not necessarily require that the target be over-valued 
prior to the acquisition.  
 In the context of NOLC valuation, the imposition of §382 loss-limitation rules reduces the 
NPV of the NOLC in practically all acquisitions. Despite §382, however, an NOLC may generate 
a positive price response to the extent that the market had previously discounted it. Hayn (1989) 
argues that the extent to which a firm’s NOLC is reflected in its price depends on investors’ prior 
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probabilities that the firm will realize the tax benefits of the NOLC taking into account the expected 
timing of NOL use and the firm’s marginal tax rate. 
 I identify six studies that examine the pricing of targets’ NOLCs in acquisitions. Four 
studies examine announcement returns to transactions that occurred prior to the Tax Reform of 
1986 (i.e., Haw, Pastena, and Lilien 1987; Plummer and Robinson 1990; Crawford and Lechner 
1996; Hayn 1989). The two other studies (i.e., Henning, Shaw, and Stock 2000; Chiang, 
Stammerjohan, and Englebrecht 2014) use non-conventional measures of acquisition premium and 
examine post TRA 86 acquisitions. I discuss these studies below. 
 Haw, Pastena, and Lilien (1987) examine cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 55 
targets acquired between 1968 and 1979. Using the Altman Z-score, they classify firms as healthy 
and distressed. The authors report that distressed targets experience higher returns than non-
distressed targets because of the greater potential revaluation of distressed targets’ NOLC. The 
returns are generated up to 40 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement and are fully 
impounded by six weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. The authors conclude that the 
market revalues distressed firms with NOLCs in anticipation of the possibility of a future merger.  
 Crawford and Lechner (1996), using a sample of 305 acquisitions completed between 1971 
and 1981, show that target firms’ NOLCs are 1) positively associated with the likelihood of being 
acquired, and 2) negatively associated with target announcement period returns. The authors argue 
that acquisitions are anticipated and that the market impounds the information into the target’s 
stock price well before the acquisition announcement. 
 Plummer and Robinson (1990) compare announcement abnormal returns for 29 targets 
with NOLCs against 29 matched targets without NOLCs. All deals are announced between 1970 
and 1982. The authors find that targets’ acquisition announcement returns are not significantly 
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different between the two subsamples. The authors also test for whether the market anticipates an 
acquisition and prices NOLs beforehand, as suggested by Haw et al. (1987) and Crawford and 
Lechner (1996), but do not find such an effect. 
 In her seminal work, Hayn (1989) examines acquirer and target firms’ abnormal returns as 
a function of the target’s NOLC for a sample of 181 tax-free acquisitions completed between 1970 
and 1985. She finds that acquirer and target announcement returns are positive associated with the 
portion of the NOLC expiring within two years. The long-term portion of the NOLC (i.e., the 
portion not expiring within two-years) does not generate a significant price response. Hayn (1989) 
argues that the target is likely to use the long-term portion of its NOLC eventually even absent a 
merger. The acquisition creates value for the short-term NOLC because it creates an opportunity 
for the NOLC to be used whereas it may have expired unused otherwise. The magnitude of the 
coefficient on the short-lived NOLC is twice as large in the regression of target returns as compared 
to acquirer returns, suggesting that most of the expected tax benefit accrues to target shareholders.  
 As discussed in section 2.4, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, NOLCs transferred to 
acquiring firms in tax-free acquisitions, but not in taxable acquisitions. In a robustness test, Hayn 
(1989) finds that target announcement-period returns are significantly negatively associated with 
the target’s NOLC in taxable acquisitions. Hayn (1989, 141) argues that “the market partially 
capitalizes the value of this attribute prior to an acquisition announcement and lowers its 
assessment that the attribute will ever be used when a taxable acquisition is announced.” 
 It is difficult to identify the exact source of the stark difference in findings between Hayn 
(1989) and the other three studies. The difference may be due to different samples and difference 
in the measurement of the NOLC benefit (e.g., short vs long term). Moreover, Hayn (1989, 126) 
refutes the argument that the market can predict and thus price the NOLC tax benefit prior to the 
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acquisition announcement. She argues, “the market does not appear to be adept at predicting 
potential takeover targets. As shown by Palepu (1986), target firms cannot be identified using 
publicly available information. Furthermore, even if an acquisition could be forecast, its tax status 
might be difficult to anticipate.”17  
 The two studies conducted on post TRA 86 samples are unable to establish that targets’ 
NOLCs are valued in corporate acquisitions and conclude that stricter loss limitation rules under 
Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code (as amended under the Tax Reform Act of 1986), largely 
eliminate the tax benefit of the acquired NOLC. However, these studies are subject to potentially 
serious limitations.  
 Henning, Shaw, and Stock (2000) find that NOLCs are not associated with acquisition 
premium in a sample of 1071 acquisitions announced between 1990 and 1994. The authors 
measure acquisition premium as the ratio of purchase price to target book value of equity. This 
measure, which is essentially a price-to-book ratio, is not commonly used in the literature. In his 
discussion of the paper, Erickson (2000) outlines several additional limitations of this study. For 
instance, Henning et al.’s (2000) sample includes taxable acquisitions of freestanding C 
corporations and subsidiaries and divisions of C corporations. The taxation of acquisitions of 
subsidiaries and divisions differs materially from that of C corporations and the authors do not 
account for this. Moreover, Erickson (2000) argues that the sample composition contrasts with 
conventional wisdom because over 50% of the sample of taxable acquisitions of C corporations 
consists of step-up structures even though this structure is rare post TRA 86. Erickson (2000) 
concludes that there are material issues with the design and empirical analyses that make it difficult 
to interpret the results. 
                                                          
17 Prior to TRA 86, for the market to fully incorporate the value of a potential target’s NOLC, the market would have 
to anticipate whether the firm would be acquired in a taxable or tax-free acquisition. 
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 Chiang, Stammerjohan, and Englebrecht (2014) find no association between targets’ 
NOLCs and acquisition premium for a sample of 660 acquisitions that occurred between 1997 and 
2006. However, following Hayn (1989), they decompose the NOLC into short-lived and long-
lived components, and find that acquisition premium is positively associated with the short-lived 
component and negatively associated with the long-term component. The authors conclude that 
acquirers assign a significantly positive value only to the short-lived component of the NOLC 
because it must be used in the near future. A major limitation of Chiang et al. (2014) is that, like 
Henning et al. 2000, the authors’ measure of acquisition premium is a price-to-book ratio, which 
is not commonly used in the literature and difficult to interpret. The authors recognize this 
limitation, and, in their conclusion, they state that the mean acquisition premium (ratio of offer 
price to target stock price four weeks prior to acquisition announcement) is not significantly 
different between subgroups of targets with and without NOLCs. 
 In summary, there is little evidence that NOLC tax benefits are priced in M&A 
transactions. Of the six studies, only Hayn (1989) finds positive announcement returns. Although 
robust, Hayn’s (1989) results may not be generalizable after 1986 because the TRA of 86 
introduced restrictive loss-limitation rules. Hayn (1989) acknowledges that an extension of her 
study to the post TRA 86 period will provide a powerful test of whether acquirers pay for NOLCs. 
However, post TRA 86 studies, as reviewed in this section, have been unable to confirm Hayn’s 
(1989) findings. It is therefore an open empirical question as to whether targets’ NOLCs are valued 







 While there is some evidence that targets’ NOLCs were valued in acquisitions prior to Tax 
Reform of 1986 (TRA 86), studies examining acquisitions subsequent to TRA 86 have not been 
able to produce evidence that NOLC benefits matter in corporate acquisitions. One explanation of 
this is that the more restrictive §382 rules introduced by TRA 86 have largely eliminated the 
potential tax benefit. In the next chapter, I discuss the NOLC-related trade-offs that exist in 



















Chapter 4. The Tax and Non-Tax Benefits and Costs in the Acquisition of Free Standing C 
Corporations 
4.1 Introduction 
 As discussed in the previous section, net operating loss carryforwards (NOLCs) are a 
potential tax benefit in corporate acquisitions. It is important to emphasize, however, that NOLCs 
constitute only one type of tax benefit, and that there are other sources of tax and non-tax benefits 
and costs that must be considered. In section 4.2, I introduce the Scholes-Wolfson framework of 
tax planning. In Sections 4.3 to 4.6 I discuss the sources of tax and non-tax benefits and costs in 
domestic acquisitions of free-standing C corporations. Section 4.7 concludes.  
4.2 The Scholes-Wolfson Framework for Tax Planning 
 The Scholes-Wolfson paradigm provides a framework for the role of taxes in achieving 
organizational goals. The framework’s key element is that tax minimization is not necessarily 
synonymous with effective tax planning. Rather, tax minimization is simply one element of the 
cost structure of a business, and the goal is to maximize the after-tax rate of return. The paradigm 
proposes that shareholder-wealth maximization requires a contractual perspective that involves 
three key themes (Scholes et al. 2014). For a proposed transaction, the tax planner must consider 
1) all taxes (explicit and implicit), 2) the implications for all parties to the transaction, and 3) both 
the tax and non-tax costs. The paradigm implicitly assumes that if all taxes, all parties, and all costs 
can be identified and controlled, the observed tax behavior will be rational and predictable 
(Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). 
 In the spirit of Scholes-Wolfson, optimal tax planning is achieved only when the cost-
benefit trade-offs of all parties are considered. Typically, there are five parties with a vested 
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interest in an M&A transaction, the management of both firms, the shareholders of both firms, and 
the tax authority. Each party faces its own unique set of trade-offs.  
 Taxes have the potential to influence many aspects of M&A transactions. Typically, there 
three types of potential tax benefits available in acquisitions: 1) increased use of tax carryforwards, 
2) increased depreciation deductions from stepping up the tax basis of the target’s assets, and 3) 
interest deductions associated with financing the acquisition with debt. There is also a potential 
tax cost: the capital gains tax liability imposed on the target’s shareholders. In addition, there are 
various non-tax costs and benefits to consider.  
 A merger creates value only if the same benefit is not available, or too costly to obtain, 
absent the merger. Suppose a firm has an NOLC and the firm is not expected to generate taxable 
income in the near future. The firm may still be able to utilize its NOLC by selling depreciable 
assets that have appreciated in value and using the NOLC to offset the resulting tax. If the firm 
were able to fully utilize its NOLC in this manner, the full value of the NOLC would be reflected 
in its price and no value would be created by transferring the NOLC to another firm via a merger. 
Value is created only if the firm is not able to fully utilize its NOLC, and it is transferred to a firm 
that is better able to use it in the short-term (e.g., because it has a higher marginal tax rate). 
 In evaluating the benefit available in a merger, it is crucial to determine a) can this benefit 
be obtained absent a merger? and b) to what extent is the value of this benefit already incorporated 
into stock prices? It is important to note that a symmetrical argument exists for potential costs, 






4.3 Medium of Exchange and Acquisition Tax Status  
 The tax status of the acquisition is important not only because it dictates the type of tax 
benefits available in the acquisition, but also how those benefits are allocated between the parties 
to the transaction. Taxable acquisitions offer two types of benefits that are typically not available 
in tax-free acquisitions. First, taxable acquisitions allow for the payment to be financed via external 
debt and thus provide a tax benefit associated with the tax deductibility of interest. Second, some 
taxable acquisition structures allow for the target’s assets to be stepped-up from historic cost to 
the purchase price (i.e., fair market value) and this induces a tax-benefit via higher future 
depreciation deductions.  
 However, taxable acquisitions also impose a major cost by triggering an immediate capital 
gains tax to the target firm’s shareholders. Thus, effective tax planning requires that the discounted 
value of the NOLC and debt tax shields be considered in light of the immediate capital gains tax.  
 Prior to 1986, targets’ NOLCs generally always transferred to the acquirer in a tax-free 
stock acquisition, but only sometimes in a taxable cash acquisition. The potential forgone NOL-
related tax benefit imposed an additional cost on taxable cash acquisitions. Tax Reform Act of 
1986 altered the tax incentive such that in post-1986 transactions, NOLCs transfer to the acquirer 
regardless of the acquisition’s tax status (Scholes et al. 2014).18  
 Examining 318 pre-TRA 86 transactions that occurred between 1968 and 1983, Auerbach 
and Reishus (1987c) find no significant evidence that acquirers preserve targets’ NOLC by opting 
for a tax-free structure. The authors conclude, “even where potential tax benefits have been 
identified, we have not yet found any evidence that they have played an important role in the 
                                                          
18 NOLCs do not transfer in taxable acquisitions structured as asset acquisitions or stock acquisitions with a 
§338(h)(10) election. However, these two structures are rarely used in acquisitions of free standing C corporations. 
See Appendix A.  
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structure and frequency of mergers and acquisitions” (p. 81). This suggests that the tax and non-
tax costs associated with tax-free stock acquisitions were greater than the potential NOLC tax 
benefit during this period.  
 Consistent with high cost of stock payment, it is well documented that stock offers generate 
significantly lower bidder deal-announcement returns than cash offers (e.g., Travlos 1987). Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that public bidders for public targets generate, on average, a 
significant -1% five-day cumulative abnormal return on the announcement date. Decomposing 
returns based on the medium of exchange, the authors find that all-stock deals generate a 
significant -1.86% return, while cash and mixed deals do not generate a significant price response. 
In their sample, a 1% wealth-decline translates to a reduction in market capitalization of $5 ($50) 
million for the mean (median) acquirer, suggesting that stock offers destroy considerable bidder 
shareholder-wealth.  
 One explanation for the differential price response for stock relative to cash deals is that 
the medium of exchange reveals information about the true value of the parties to the transactions. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that an equity issuance signals to the market that a firm is over-
valued. In subsequent work, Hansen (1987) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) develop models in 
which the medium of exchange reveals information about the target’s value. In these models, a 
stock offer signals potential overvaluation of the target. Hansen (1987, p. 76) argues that stock 
offers have a “contingency pricing effect” whereby target shareholders are forced to share the risk 
that the acquirer overpays. The implication is that stock offers destroy value because they signal 
potential adverse selection.  
 A second explanation suggests that stock offers impose costs on the acquiring firm’s 
management by diluting ownership and increasing the probability of loss of control. Managers 
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have incentive to increase debt and use the proceeds to repurchase equity held by outside investors 
because this increases their probability of maintaining control over the firm (Harris and Raviv 
1988; Stulz 1988). Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) and Martin (1996) find a positive association 
between the acquirer’s managerial ownership and the likelihood of a cash payment, suggesting 
that managers who value control prefer to pay cash for acquisitions to avoid ownership dilution 
and the possible loss of control. Though unfavorable to the acquirer’s management, stock offers 
are preferred by the target’s management because stock offers increase the likelihood of the 
targets’ managements’ job retention (Ghosh and Ruland 1998). 
 There is also a potential tax explanation for the negative acquirer wealth effects of stock 
offers. Stock issuance increases the acquirer’s risk of triggering a §382 ownership change of its 
own stock. This is especially costly for an acquirer with a substantial loss carryforward. Erickson 
(1998) notes that several of the acquiring firms with NOLCs in his sample explicitly disclose that 
they are opting for taxable acquisitions to avoid the potential for §382 limitations on their tax 
attributes. Erickson, Ton, and Wang (2019) find that, conditional on the acquirer having an NOLC, 
stock payments generate significantly lower acquirer announcement returns than cash payments.   
4.4 Capital Gains Tax Liability 
 The tax status of the acquisition determines the amount and timing of the payment of target 
shareholders’ capital gains tax liability. The tax liability is computed as the excess of sale price 
over historic cost (i.e., the realized capital gain) multiplied by the applicable tax rate.  In taxable 
acquisitions, target firms’ shareholders pay capital gains tax on the realized gain on their shares 
immediately upon the transaction’s closing. If the acquisition qualifies as tax-free, however, the 
recognition of the realized gain and the related tax liability is deferred until a subsequent taxable 
event. By triggering the capital gains tax liability, taxable acquisitions accelerate the tax payment 
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and this imposes a cost on the transaction because the target’s shareholders lose the time value of 
money. In addition, if a shareholder’s holding period is less than 12 months, then the realized 
capital gain is taxed at the higher tax rate on ordinary income.  
 The extent to which target shareholders’ capital gains tax liability affects the structure 
and/or pricing of an acquisition depends on two conditions: 1) whether the tax liability can be 
avoided or deferred, and 2) the degree to which the tax liability is previously impounded in the 
target’s stock price. Under either condition, the null is that capital gains taxes are irrelevant because 
of the existence of tax-advantaged vehicles.  
 To the extent that stock-for-stock tax-free acquisitions perfectly substitute for cash-for-
stock taxable acquisitions, target shareholders’ capital gains tax liability is not a significant cost of 
undertaking an acquisition. This equivalence assumption requires that each structure be associated 
with the same net-benefit. Ayers et al. (2007) find that an increase in the individual capital gains 
tax rate reduces the number of taxable acquisitions, but has no effect on the number of tax-free 
acquisitions, suggesting that the two structures are not perfect substitutes and that capital gains tax 
liabilities generally cannot be avoided. 
 There are competing theories on the effect of capital gains taxes on asset prices. The 
capitalization effect (i.e., the demand side argument) predicts that investors are willing to pay less 
for assets in which they have to pay capital gains taxes and this depresses asset prices (e.g., Lang 
and Shackelford 2000). The opposing theory, referred to as the lock-in effect (i.e., the supply-side 
argument), proposes that investors require higher prices to sell assets if they are subject to taxes, 
suggesting a positive association between the capital gains tax rate and asset prices (e.g., Klein 
2001). Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang (2008) provide evidence that the two effects co-
exist, and the one that dominates depends on shifts in the asset’s demand and supply curves. 
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 Variation in cost basis and holding period among investors of an asset induce 
heterogeneous capital gains tax liabilities. Bradley et al. (1988) and Klein (1999) argue that this 
heterogeneity causes an upward sloping supply curve for the target’s shares (i.e., the acquirer’s 
offer price exceeds with the percentage of the target’s stock that the acquirer seeks to own). The 
implication is that the target’s pre-acquisition price reflects the cost of accelerating the capital 
gains tax only of the marginal seller, and that the acquisition premium must be large enough to 
compensate for the capital gains tax cost to the price-setting shareholder. The price-setting 
shareholder is the investor whose reservation price must be met to obtain control of the target firm.  
 Early literature conjectures that target shareholder taxes influence acquisition structure and 
pricing, but does not provide direct empirical evidence. Mandelker (1974) posits that the higher 
acquisition announcement returns to target shareholders relative to acquirer shareholders suggests 
that the acquirer compensates the target’s shareholders for their capital gains tax liability. Other 
studies, observing higher target shareholder wealth-effects in cash deals relative to stock deals, 
conclude that target shareholders demand compensation for their tax liability (Wansley, Lane, and 
Yang 1983; Huang and Walkling 1987).  
 Brown and Ryngaert (1991) theorize that bidders with unfavorable private information 
about their equity prefer to pay with stock rather than cash to avoid compensating target 
shareholders for capital gains taxes. Despite the tax incentive, early studies were generally unable 
to establish direct evidence to support theoretical models that the magnitude of target shareholders’ 
capital gains liability increases the likelihood of a tax-free stock-for-stock acquisition (e.g. 
Auerbach and Reischus 1998c; Erickson 1998).  
 One explanation for this is that it is difficult to compute an accurate measure of the capital 
gains tax liability. The computation requires four inputs: sale price, historic cost, holding period, 
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and the tax rate. Target shareholders’ stock basis and holding period is not observable. Both 
Auerbach and Reischus (1998c) and Erickson (1998) assume a 2-year holding period. Anecdotally, 
however, it appears that the average holding period tends to be much longer. For instance, 
Landsman and Shackelford (1995) use proprietary data and find that the average holding period in 
the RJR Nabisco takeover was just under 10 years.  
 However, it is difficult to attribute the lack of evidence entirely to the short-holding period. 
The alternative explanation is that the average gain does not accurately capture the tax liability of 
the price-setting shareholder. This argument is consistent with an upward sloping supply curve for 
the target’s shares (Bradley et al. 1988; Klein 1999). Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2003; 
2004) overcome this limitation by identifying shareholder capital gains using cross-temporal 
changes in the individual long-term capital gains rate and cross-sectional variation in target 
institutional ownership. The underlying assumption in the identification strategy is that 
institutional investors are often tax-exempt, and the more shares held by tax-exempt investors the 
less that the capital gains tax liability matters for obtaining control. The authors provide evidence 
that target shareholders’ capital gains tax liabilities are positively associated with tax-free stock-
for-stock acquisition structures (Ayers et al. 2004) and higher acquisition premium conditional on 
tax status (Ayers et al. 2003). 
  More recently, however, Hanlon et al. (2020) show that the effects documented by Ayers 
et al. (2003; 2004) are dominated by the CEO’s tax liability, suggesting that CEO is the price-
setting shareholder. A potential limitation is that the tests use a limited sample because CEO data 
available from Execucomp covers S&P 1500 firms only. 
 In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that the acquirer mostly bears the cost of 
target shareholder’s capital gains tax liability. This induces a tax-incentive to structure the 
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transaction as a tax-free stock-for-stock acquisition because if the transaction is structured as a 
taxable cash-for-stock acquisition, the acquirer must offer a premium that is large enough to cover 
the capital gains tax liability of the price-setting shareholder. There remains ambiguity, however, 
on who the price-setting shareholder is. 
4.5 Tax Benefit of Debt Financing 
 The method of financing identifies the acquirer’s source of funds. Generally, the method 
of payment and method of financing are the same in stock-for-stock acquisitions. This is not the 
case, however, in cash-for-stock or cash-for-asset acquisitions because a cash payment can be 
financed with internal cash reserves and/or external borrowing.  
 The neoclassical investment model predicts that corporate financial decisions are irrelevant 
to firm value. Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that in frictionless capital markets the 
probability distribution of cash flows is independent of capital structure, implying that firm value 
equals the value of equity plus the value of debt, but that the proportions of debt and equity are 
irrelevant.19 The MM theorem holds under the following assumptions: 1) zero transactions costs, 
2) symmetric information, 3) complete contracting, 4) complete markets, and 5) absence of 
corporate and personal taxes. If the assumptions are relaxed and imperfections are introduced, 
however, the theorem no longer holds, corporate policy can affect firm value, and the firm should 
pursue a given policy until the marginal benefit of doing so equals the marginal cost.  
 In a subsequent paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) relax the assumption of no taxes, and 
demonstrate that the tax deductibility of interest payments cause the value of the firm to rise by 
                                                          
19 A competing theory of capital structure is the pecking order of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). The 
theory proposes that there is a financing hierarchy of retained earnings, debt, and then equity. Equity financing is least 
desirable because of the associated adverse selection costs. As discussed by Graham and Leary (2011, p 10), the 
pecking order theory “was not designed as a general theory to explain capital structure for all firms in all settings; 
rather, the original theory is geared towards mature, low growth-option firms.” In addition, Frank and Goyal (2003) 
note that the pecking order theory predicts capital structure progressively worse in the 1990s than in earlier decades.  
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the amount of the tax subsidy. Given that the firm’s objective function is linear and there is no 
offsetting cost of debt, this implies that the firm should be financed entirely with debt.20 However, 
subsequent work introduces trade-offs to the tax benefits of debt, such as financial distress (Kraus 
and Litzenberger 1973; Scott 1976) and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). 
Nonetheless, the main theme of Modigliani and Miller (1963) still holds: 1) the incentive to finance 
with debt increases with the corporate marginal tax rate, and 2) firm value increases with the use 
of debt up to the point where the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit. 
 Despite the tax advantage, the deductibility of interest in itself is not an incentive to merge. 
Absent a merger, a firm can simply borrow to repurchase its shares and thereby obtain access to 
the same tax advantage. Although not an incentive to merge, the tax-advantage of debt is an 
incentive to borrow. Corporate acquisitions enhance the tax benefit of borrowing by reducing the 
agency costs of debt. Agency conflicts may lead to an overly cautious debt policy, and to the extent 
that the target is underleveraged, an acquisition allows access to the untapped tax gain from 
additional use of debt capacity which increases firm value. Even absent agency frictions, 
acquisitions enhance the tax benefit of borrowing by pooling the two firms’ idiosyncratic risks and 
thus reducing the non-tax borrowing costs and the deadweight costs of bankruptcy.  
 The conjecture that acquisitions enhance the tax benefit of borrowing is generally not 
supported in the literature. Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) examine debt-equity ratios two years 
before and two years after the merger. Despite rising debt-equity ratios during the sample period 
(1968 to 1983), the authors find only a modest increase of 2.1 percentage points, from 30% before 
to 32.1% after the merger. The authors reach similar conclusions in their two subsequent studies 
                                                          
20 The tax code generally favors debt over equity by allowing debt-costs (i.e., interest) to be deducted against the 
corporate tax, but not equity-costs (i.e., dividends). This asymmetric treatment results in two layers of tax on equity-




(Auerbach and Reishus 1988b; Auerbach and Reishus 1988c) and conclude that the potential 
increase in interest deductions is not a major tax benefit in acquisitions. 
 Using Value Line performance forecasts, Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2009) 
estimate that in their sample of 264 mergers completed between 1980 and 2004, the average 
synergy gain is 10.04% of the market value of the combined firm. Decomposing the synergy gains, 
the authors find that only 1.64% is due to tax savings projected from an increase in debt tax shields. 
The authors conclude that the “relatively small magnitude of interest tax shields documented here 
suggests that financial synergies are not a major source of merger gains” (p. 1193). The lack of 
evidence on the tax benefit of interest tax shields in acquisition financing suggests either that the 
tax and non-tax costs of debt financing outweigh the potential benefits, or that potential debt trade-
offs have not been accounted for.  
 DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) demonstrate that interest deductions and other investment-
related tax shields are substitutable. In the acquisition setting, this predicts that the acquirer trades-
off the present value of potential interest deductions from financing the acquisition with debt 
against the present value of tax losses acquired from the target. Thus, one explanation for why debt 
is used sparingly is that the tax value of target’s tax losses generally exceeds the projected benefit 
from interest-deductibility. However, this explanation is not supported empirically.  
 Examining a sample of 340 acquisitions completed between 1985 and 1988, Erickson 
(1998) models the choice between 100% debt and 100% stock financing as a function of acquirer 
and target firm characteristics. As predicted by the neoclassical investment model, he finds that 
the probability of debt-financing increases with the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. Inconsistent with 
the trade-off theory, however, he does not find evidence of the predicted negative association 
between the target firm’s NOLC and the probability of debt financing.   
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 Dhaliwal et al. (2005) re-examine the trade-off between target NOLC and debt financing 
by modelling the choice between 100% debt and 100% cash financing in a sample of 167 taxable 
cash acquisitions completed between 1987 and 1997. By focusing only on taxable cash 
acquisitions, the authors examine the financing choice independently of the tax-status of the 
acquisition. Despite isolating the financing method from tax-status, however, the authors do not 
find evidence in support of the predicted negative association between target NOLCs and debt 
financing.  
 One explanation for this lack of findings is that, despite the small tax benefit of debt (e.g., 
Auerbach and Reishus 1988a; Devos et al. 2009), the tax benefit of NOLCs is even smaller. 
Erickson (1998) estimates that, conditional on reporting a positive NOLC, the median target firm 
in his sample has an NOLC of $2.6 million while the median value of interest tax-shields from 
debt-financing is $8.1 million. He concludes that “the acquiring firm's traits significantly influence 
a transaction's structure, while the target firm's attributes are relatively unimportant in most 
acquisitions” (p. 281). 
4.6 Step-up Structures 
 A step-up occurs when the price that the acquirer pays for the target’s depreciable assets 
exceeds the undepreciated balance of the assets for tax purposes. The step-up of the target’s assets 
from historic cost to the purchase price (i.e., fair market value) allows for higher depreciation tax 
shields, and thus creates a tax benefit that would not be available if the target’s recorded asset 
values were carried over to the combined entity unchanged.  
 The available tax benefit from a step-up can be further increased by the discretion available 
to the acquirer in the purchase price allocation. In purchasing a pool of assets, the purchase price 
is allocated to assets based on their fair market value. In practice, a reasonable range of values 
34 
 
exist and managers have discretion over the allocation assigned to specific assets. Generally, the 
tax benefit of the step-up increases with the proportion of the purchase price that is allocated to 
shorter-lived assets eligible for accelerated depreciation as opposed to indefinite-lived intangibles 
or goodwill which are depreciated for tax purposes on a straight-line basis over 15 years.21 
 Step-up structures are also associated with significant costs. Step-ups impose a capital 
gains tax to the target corporation on the difference between the recorded fair market value (i.e., 
sale price) and historic cost. Unlike the depreciation tax benefit, which is generated over 
subsequent years, the capital gains tax is due immediately. The capital gains tax can be offset by 
the target’s tax attributes (e.g., carryforwards and credits), but any unused portion does not transfer 
to the combined entity. Moreover, because step-ups are taxable acquisitions, target shareholders 
are subject to capital gains tax on the recognized gain on their shares. Thus, step-up structures 
impose two levels of taxation. For a step-up to provide a net-positive tax benefit, the present value 
of depreciation deductions available from the step-up must exceed the two levels of capital gains 
tax net of the target’s NOLC. 
 The above discussion suggests that the gain from the step-up could be potentially large if 
the capital gains tax were eliminated (as would be the case if the target’s NOLC fully offset the 
tax). Under prior tax law, the General Utilities doctrine (codified by the IRS in 1954) eliminated 
the corporate-level capital gains tax on all distributions of property to its shareholders (Kahng 
                                                          
21 Historically, the amortization of goodwill was not tax-deductible. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
enacted §197 of the Internal Revenue Code provided for a 15-year tax-deductible amortization of purchased 
intangibles, including goodwill, for qualifying acquisitions (i.e., taxable asset purchases) after August 10, 1993. 
Studies document that although the increased potential tax benefit from amortizing goodwill resulted in higher 
acquisition premiums, it did not increase the incidence of step-up structures (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2000; 
Henning and Shaw 2000; Weaver 2000). This suggests that 1) tax deductibility of goodwill was not a significant 
enough of a benefit to incentivize step-up structures, and that 2) if a step-up structure is elected, at least some of the 
tax benefit accrues to target shareholders via higher premiums. The sample composition varies across the studies. 
Weaver examines 279 taxable asset and stock divestitures completed between 1991 and 1994. Ayers et al. (2000) 
examine taxable acquisitions of subsidiaries, private corporations, and public corporations completed between 1990 
and 1996. Henning and Shaw (2000) examine 1741 asset and stock purchases completed between 1990 and 1994.  
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1998). This exemption created a tax incentive for an acquirer to step-up a target’s assets to the 
purchase price and obtain a depreciation tax-benefit without incurring the offsetting capital gains 
tax. Because a step-up structure imposed only one level of taxation (i.e., shareholder capital gains 
tax), it was considered a tax-advantaged acquisition structure.22  
 The TRA 86 repealed the General Utilities doctrine, thereby subjecting step-up structures 
to two levels of taxation, and thus reducing their incidence (Scholes et al. 2015). However, even 
prior to TRA 86, anecdotes and empirical evidence suggests that step-up benefits did not matter in 
the acquisition of free standing C corporations. Auerbach and Resihus (1998a) estimate that in 
only 2 out of 40 acquisitions did the step-up benefit exceed the target’s NOLC. Similarly, 
Auerbach and Resihus (1998b) estimate the potential tax benefit from a step-up structure averages 
only about 2% of the target’s value. Erickson (1998; 2000) argues that step-ups were uncommon 
prior to TRA and even more rare afterward because the capital gains tax liability typically exceeds 
the present value of the future tax benefits from depreciation deductions, thereby making step-ups 
a negative NPV decision. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 The Scholes-Wolfson framework proposes that shareholder-wealth maximization requires 
a contractual perspective that involves three key themes, “all taxes, all parties, and all costs”. Net 
operating losses represent only one type of potential tax benefit available in M&A transactions. 
Effective tax planning, and thus shareholder-wealth maximization, requires that this benefit be 
valued in light of other tax and non-tax benefits and costs, such as the medium of exchange, the 
method of acquisition financing, step-up structures, and target shareholders’ capital gains tax 
                                                          
22 Gilson, Scholes and Wolfson (1988) argue that this does not constitute an acquisition-related tax benefit because a 
firm could obtain a similar tax-favored outcome by distributing its assets to its shareholders absent an acquisition. 
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liability. In the following chapter, I develop my testable hypotheses while taking into consideration 
























Chapter 5. Hypothesis Development 
5.1 Introduction 
 There are at least two fundamental decisions that an acquirer makes in undertaking an 
acquisition once it identifies a potential target. First, the acquirer decides how much to offer the 
target’s shareholders for their stock. Second, the acquirer decides on the medium of exchange and 
method of acquisition financing. Hypotheses 1 and 2, discussed in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, predict 
the effect of the target’s NOLC on acquisition premium and financing, respectively. Section 5.3 
provides a summary.  
5.2 Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1) – Acquisition Premium 
 Suppose TargetCo_1 and TargetCo_2 have assets in place that are expected to generate the 
same stream of future cash flows with a present value of $10 million, and that TargetCo_2 
additionally has an NOLC of $5 million. Assuming that the fair market value (MV) of 
TargetCo_2’s stock equals $10 million on the date of ownership change, and that the federal long-
term tax-exempt rate (FLTR) equals 2 percent, under §382, AcquisitionCo can offset an annual 
maximum of $200,000 of income in any post-acquisition year (MV * FLTR = $10 million * 2%). 
Given that an NOL can be carried forward 20 years, AcquisitionCo can use up to $4 million of 
TargetCo_2’s NOLC to offset its income over the 20-year period ($200,000 x 20 years). In this 
scenario, $1 million of the NOLC is eliminated and the present value of the $4 million in tax losses 
that can be used, at a 10% discount rate, is $1.7 million. This example assumes that AcquisitionCo 
is taxable. 
 Holding all else constant, an acquirer with a relatively high marginal tax rate (MTR) is 
better able to use a greater portion of the acquired NOLC in the short-term as compared to an 
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acquirer with a relatively low MTR. Accordingly, a high MTR acquirer will assign a higher present 
value to TargetCo_2’s NOLC as compared to a low MTR acquirer. An acquirer with a marginal 
tax rate of 0% is indifferent between the two target corporations and should be willing to pay the 
same amount for either target (i.e., $10 million). As the acquirer’s marginal tax rate increases, its 
valuation of the two targets diverges. The value of TargetCo_1 remains at $10 million, while the 
value of TargetCo_2 increases with the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. The value of TargetCo_2 to 
the acquirer is some amount X, where $10 million < X < $11.7 million. 
 Assuming that the target’s NOLC increases the acquirer’s reservation price, the question 
still remains as to why the acquirer would pay for the target’s NOLC? In acquisitions, the deal 
price is determined by negotiations between the acquirer and target. The acquirer will pay 
consideration up to the value of the target’s expected future cash-flows plus expected synergies, 
while the target will accept no less than its own value (Hansen 1987). Laamanen (2007) argues 
that to the extent that the target’s shareholders recognize the higher potential value of the firm’s 
assets to the acquirer, the target’s shareholders may not sell their shares at the prevailing market 
price. Acquirers’ tax status can easily be observed from public information and thus the target’s 
shareholders may demand higher compensation from an acquirer that derives a higher value from 
the NOLC.23 
 My first hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is as follows: 
H1: There is a positive association between the target’s NOLC and acquisition premium that is 
increasing in the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. 
 
  
                                                          
23 My argument is similar to that of Schleifer and Vishny (1992) and Clark and Ofek (1994) that shareholders of 
distressed targets receive higher premiums if the distressed target provides greater synergies to the acquirer. 
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5.2.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2) – Acquisition Financing 
 With respect to acquisition financing, the acquirer considers the marginal benefits and 
marginal costs of both debt and non-debt (i.e., stock and/or internal cash) financing. The trade-off 
theory suggests that debt and non-debt tax shields are substitutable (i.e., DeAngelo and Masulis 
1980). Acquisitions are major investments and the method of financing can significantly alter the 
acquiring firm’s capital structure. Debt-financed acquisitions increase leverage and generate 
material interest tax-shields, and this has a direct and immediate effect on the acquirer’s marginal 
tax rate. By reducing the acquirer’s marginal tax rate, debt financing reduces the NPV of the 
target’s NOLC to the acquirer. Alternatively, if an acquirer has sufficient non-debt tax shields from 
its own NOLC, investment tax credits, and asset depreciation, and from the NOLC it will acquire 
from the target, there is no marginal benefit of interest tax shields from debt financing.  
 In practice, if the target has an NOLC, the acquirer will choose the mix of debt and non-
debt financing for which the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs.  
Suppose AcquisitionCo purchases TargetCo_2.  
Scenario 1: if AcquisitionCo projects taxable income of $200,000 or less in each of the 20 post-
acquisition years, then it should prefer 100% non-debt financing. TargetCo_2’s NOLC will fully 
offset AcquisitionCo’s post-acquisition taxable income (for up to 20 years) and there is no 
marginal benefit of interest tax shields. 
Scenario 2: If AcquisitionCo expects to generate more than $200,000 in taxable income, it should 
prefer a mix of debt and non-debt financing. The target’s NOLC will offset the $200,000 each year 
and interest-deductions from debt-financing offset at least some additional income.  
My second hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is as follows: 
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H2: The probability of at least partial debt financing is relatively lower in acquisitions in which 
the target has an NOLC. 
 This hypothesis assumes that the acquirer chooses the optimal capital structure for which 
the marginal costs of debt equal the marginal benefit. In other words, the tax-benefit from the 
optimal amount of debt financing (i.e., where there is perfect NOLC-debt substitution) is equal to 
the offsetting costs of debt (i.e., financial distress and potential loss of corporate control). This 
hypothesis also assumes that the cost-benefit of all alternative combinations of financing are held 
constant. Consider the acquisition of TargetCo_2 by a cash-constrained acquirer whose 
management believes that its equity is under-valued. If debt-financing is the least costly financing 
alternative, the acquirer may opt for a 100% debt-financed transaction. To the extent that the 
acquirer has insufficient capacity for additional tax deductions beyond the NPV of the interest tax 
shield, the acquirer will effectively forgo the NPV of the NOLC. In such a scenario, there is a 
positive NOLC-debt association. Across the sample of acquisitions, the observed effect will 
depend on the average association in the cross-section. This could lead to observing a positive, 
negative, or zero NOLC-debt association. 
5.3 Conclusions 
 In this Chapter, I present my two formal hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive 
association between the target’s NOLC and acquisition premium that is increasing with the 
acquirer’s marginal tax rate. Hypothesis 2 predicts that an acquisition is less likely to be debt-






Chapter 6. Research Design and Sample Selection 
6.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I present my research design and describe my sample selection procedure. 
Section 6.2 presents my empirical models. The regression models to test hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
presented in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, respectively. In section 6.2.3 I discuss the variables I include 
in my models. Section 6.3 presents my sample selection procedure. Section 6.4 discusses sample 
statistics. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes.  
6.2 Empirical Models  
6.2.1 Model of Acquisition Premium 
 My first hypothesis predicts a positive association between the magnitude of a firm’s 
NOLC and the premium it receives conditional on the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. I use the 
following OLS model to test my first hypothesis: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋 + 𝜀   (1) 
Premium is the excess of the offer price over target’s trading price, scaled by the target’s trading 
price. Following prior literature, I use the trading price four weeks prior to the transaction 
announcement date. NOLC_mv is the gross dollar amount of the target’s federal net operating loss 
carry-forward scaled by trading price four weeks prior to the transaction announcement date. MTR 
is the acquirer’s marginal tax rate as simulated by Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010).24 X is a vector 
                                                          
24 An MTR is the present value of current and expected future taxes paid on an additional dollar of income earned 
today. Consequently, the computation of MTR requires an estimate of present and future taxable income and tax loss 
carryovers. Many studies rely on simulated marginal tax rates developed by Graham (1996a; 1996b) based upon the 
approach of Shevlin (1990). Graham simulates his MTRs under the assumption that a firm’s future taxable income 
follows a random walk. Blouin et al. (2010) argue that while stock returns follow a random walk, income mean-reverts 
due to transitory components in accounting income. Blouin et al. (2010) use a non-parametric approach to simulating 
MTRs in which they assume that future taxable income is a function of current performance and firm size. Proxies for 
the marginal tax rate (MTR) can be computed as either pre or post financing. The latter deducts interest expense from 
taxable income in computing the MTR. Accordingly, post financing MTRs tend to be lower than pre financing MTRs, 
on average. Both proxies are subject to limitation. The post-financing MTR is endogenously affected by financing 
decisions (e.g., Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim 1998), while the pre-financing MTR may overstate the tax benefit 
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of the determinants of acquisition premium. This includes acquirer, target, and deal attributes. I 
defer the discussion of these variables to section 6.2.3. Standard errors are clustered by target 
industry (2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC)).  
 In equation (1), 𝛽1 captures the effect of the acquirer’s marginal tax rate on premium for 
deals in which the target does not have an NOLC (i.e., NOLC_mv = 0). 𝛽2 captures the effect of 
the target’s NOLC on premium for deals in which the acquirer is not taxable (i.e., MTR = 0). 𝛽3 
captures the effect of the target’s NOLC on premium conditioning on the acquirer’s marginal tax 
rate. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive coefficient on 𝛽3. Because I use the gross NOLC from the 
tax footnotes (as opposed to the tax-effected amount reported in the deferred tax asset), the 
maximum tax-benefit of a dollar of NOLC is $0.35. Due to §382 restrictions, however, the 
observed premium per dollar of NOLC must be lower than $0.35.   
6.2.2 Model of Acquisition Financing 
 The trade-off theory proposes that debt and non-debt tax shields are substitutable 
(Modigliani and Miller 1958; DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). Accordingly, my second hypothesis 
predicts that the probability that an acquisition is financed with debt is relatively lower if the target 
has an NOLC. To test this, I use the following probit regression to model the acquirer’s choice to 
finance the acquisition with bank debt:  
Pr(> 0% 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑛) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝑅 +  𝛽𝑘𝑍 + 𝜀    (2) 
>0% BankFin equals one if the acquisition is at least partially financed with a bank loan. NOLC_d 
equals one if the target has a federal net operating loss carryforward. MTR is the acquirer’s 
marginal tax rate as previously defined. Z is a vector of the determinants of acquisition financing. 
I discuss these determinants in the following section. I adjust standard errors for acquirers’ within-
                                                          
of debt. In my tests, I use the post-financing corporate marginal tax rate as of the end of the fiscal year immediately 
prior to the year of the acquisition announcement. 
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industry (2-digit SIC) correlation because acquisitions tend to cluster by industry (Gort 1969; 
Palepu 1986). 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive coefficient on 𝛽1. I do not make any formal predictions on 
the economic magnitude of 𝛽1. The coefficient on 𝛽2 captures the effect of the acquirer’s marginal 
tax rate on the probability of debt-financing. Consistent with prior work (e.g., Erickson 1998), I 
expect a positive coefficient on 𝛽2.  
6.2.3 Determinants of Acquisition Premium and Financing 
 Vectors (X) and (Z) capture the determinants of acquisition premium and financing, 
respectively. Both vectors include a common set of target, acquirer, and deal characteristics. To 
control for potential merger waves arising from industry shocks (e.g., Harford 2005), I also include 
the interactions of announcement year and target industry (1-digit SIC) dummies. 
 Controlling for target characteristics is crucial because if loss firms differ systematically 
from profitable firms, then the effect of NOLC-related correlated omitted variables will bias my 
results. It is well-documented that NOLCs are associated with investment (e.g., Auerbach 1986; 
Waegenaere, Sansing, and Wielhouwer 2020; Krieg, Krull, and Li 2020). Accordingly, I control 
for capital expenditures (Capex), research and development expenditures (R&D), and intangible 
assets (Intangible). I additionally control for investment opportunity (Q) and the riskiness of firm 
investment (EBITDA_SD) (Langenmayr and Lester 2018). Following Favilukisy, Giammarino, 
and Pizarro 2016, I include controls for the target’s stock return (Return) and stock return volatility 
(Volatility). Finally, I control for earnings management (Accruals) (e.g., Maydew 1997; Albring, 
Dhaliwal, Khurana, and Pereira 2011; Erickson, Heitzman, and Zhang 2013). 
 Both vectors additionally control for acquirer attributes identified by prior literature to be 
associated with acquisition financing and premium (e.g., Martin 1996; Erickson 1998; Dhaliwal 
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et al. 2005; Chow, Klassen, and Liu 2016).25 I control for the acquirer’s overvaluation (Q)26, 
market performance (Return), cash holdings (Cash), tangibility (PPE), ratio of debt-to-equity 
(D/E), research and development expenditures (R&D), and institutional ownership (InstOwn).27 
 Deal characteristics include dummies for whether the deal is a tender offer (Tender), the 
presence of multiple bidders (Competition), the acquirer and target are in the same 2-digit SIC 
industry code (Horizontal Deal), the takeover is hostile (Hostile), and the acquirer’s accounting 
method for the acquisition (Pooling). I additionally control for the relative size of the target to the 
acquirer (Relative Size) and the size of the deal (Deal Size).  
 Finally, I use Ayers et al.’s (2003; 2004) approach to control for the target shareholders’ 
capital gains tax liability. The approach involves interactions between three variables, Taxable, 
CG, and InstOwn. Taxable equals one if stock consideration makes up less than 80% of the total 
deal consideration.28 CG is the 10-year change in the top federal individual capital gains tax rate.29 
InstOwn is the percent of the target’s shares held by institutions. I expect a positive coefficient on 
Taxable*CG and a negative coefficient on Taxable*CG*InstOwn. This method of controlling for 
the capital gains tax liability assumes that institutional investors are, on average, tax-exempt and 
                                                          
25 The behavioral finance literature identifies numerous behavioral factors that influence corporate decisions. For 
example, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that CEO overconfidence is significantly negatively associated with 
acquisition announcement returns. Most behavioral proxies are market-based and thus also reflect firm characteristics. 
Recent work challenges the construct validity of commonly used market-based proxies for CEO behavioral 
characteristics (e.g., Bouwman 2009; Cao 2011; Han, Lai, and Ho 2016). Accordingly, I do not attempt to include 
behavioral factors in my empirical models. 
26 Overvalued bidders are more likely to pay with stock rather than with cash (Schleifer and Vishny 2003; Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 2006). See Section 4.3 for a discussion of the adverse selection associated with 
stock payment.  
27 I do not control for the acquirer’s size and profitability because they are highly correlated with the MTR proxy. As 
discussed in footnote 24, Blouin et al. (2010) simulate the MTR under the assumption that future taxable income is a 
function of current performance and firm size. 
28 Generally, for an acquisition to qualify as tax-free the payment must consist mostly of the acquirer’s stock with the 
exception of cash paid in lieu of fractional shares. Additionally, the acquirer must obtain 80% control of the target. To 
classify transactions as taxable and tax-free, studies typically use a cut-off percentage less 100% to allow for the 
possibility that some cash was included as payment for fractional shares (e.g., Hanlon et al. 2020). 
29 The holding period is typically not observable. However, Landsman and Shackelford (1995) use proprietary data 
and find that the average holding period in the RJR Nabisco takeover was just under 10 years. 
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that a target with a larger fraction of institutional holdings is less sensitive to the tax status of the 
acquisition.   
6.3 Data Sources and Sample 
 My data come from various sources. I use SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions database 
to obtain my sample of M&A transactions and data on deal characteristics, including premium and 
financing. I obtain financial statement data for the acquirer and target from Compustat in the year 
prior to the acquisition announcement. Stock price data is obtained from The Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP). I use Blouin, Core, and Guay’s (2010) simulated marginal tax rates 
which I obtain from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Data on institutional ownership is 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings. Finally, I hand-collect target firms’ 
NOLC from their 10-k filings available on EDGAR.   
 My sample selection procedure is as follows. I require that 1) the transaction is classified 
as either a merger or an acquisition, 2) the transaction is announced between 1995 and 201630, 3) 
the transaction value is at least $1 million, 4) the acquirer does not hold any equity in the target 
prior to the acquisition and seeks to own 100% of the target after the acquisition, 5) both acquirer 
and target are public U.S. incorporated firms, 5) neither the acquirer or the target is a subsidiary of 
another firm, 6) neither the acquirer or the target belongs to a regulated industry (SIC 6000-6999 
and 4900-4999)31. This selection criterion yields 1,507 transactions. 
 For each transaction, I obtain the target firm’s 10-K filing from EDGAR for the year prior 
to the acquisition announcement. I eliminate 4 deals in which the target is an S corporation, 15 
                                                          
30 I begin my sample period for in 1995 because I hand-collect targets’ NOLC from 10-k filings in the year prior to 
the acquisition announcement and Edgar only provides consistent coverage from 1994 onward. I end my sample period 
in 2016 because the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 significantly altered NOLC provisions and the deductibility of 
interest.  
31 I remove these firms because they face regulatory capital requirements that affect their use of leverage and their tax 
planning. Some regulated firms, such as REITs, are flow-through entities and do not pay corporate taxes.  
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deals in which the target is not listed on EDGAR, and 144 deals in which the 10-K report is not 
available.32 I then eliminate 200 transactions in which the target’s reported NOLC is aggregated 
with other tax carryforwards or the NOLC is reported only in the deferred tax asset.33 Finally, I 
eliminate 116 transactions for which there is insufficient data to compute all variables in my main 
empirical tests. The final sample consists of 1,028 transactions.  
6.4 Summary Statistics 
 Figure 1 presents time-series graphs of targets’ NOLC aggregated by acquisition 
announcement year. Panel A shows the % of target firms with a federal NOLC. Panel B (Panel C) 
presents the aggregate mean (median) dollar amount of the federal NOLC. Panel D presents 
aggregate mean and median NOLC conditional on NOLC>0. The graphs show that number of 
targets that have a federal NOLC and the amount of targets’ NOLC is increasing over time.  
 Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables I use in my tests of hypotheses 1 and 
2. The mean (median) acquirer in my sample has a marginal tax rate (MTR) of 30% (34%).34 
Approximately 18.5% of deals are at least partially debt financed (>0% BankFin) and 8.2% are 
fully debt financed (100% BankFin). For the mean (median) deal, acquisition premium (Premium) 
is 46.9% (39.2%). 
  61% of targets have a federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC_d =1). This is twice 
as large as the sample mean of 30% reported by Dhaliwal et al. (2005) for targets acquired between 
1987 and 1997. My sample period, 1995-2016, slightly overlaps with Dhaliwal et al.’s (2005) and 
the percent of targets in my sample with an NOLC in 1995 of 32% is comparable with Dhaliwal 
                                                          
32 Many of these eliminations are because SDC incorrectly lists private target corporations as public. 
33 I require that target firms disclose the tax amount of their federal NOLC in the footnotes. I exclude transactions for 
which the target reports only the tax-effected amount of the NOLC in the deferred tax asset because NOLCs may 
differ for tax and financial reporting (Auerbach and Poterba 1987). 
34 Eight acquirers in my sample have simulated marginal tax rates between 36% and 38%. As discussed by Blouin et 
al. (2010), a firm may have an MTR greater than the 35% statutory corporate tax rate because of the graduated rate 
structure and particularly if the firm has an NOLC that it is carrying back.  
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et al.’s sample mean of 30%. The percent of targets with a federal NOLC in my sample increases 
over time (Figure 1 Panel A). In 2015, 84% of targets have an NOLC.  
 Erickson (1998) estimates that conditional on reporting a positive federal NOLC, the 
median target firm in his sample that was acquired between 1985 and 1988 reported $2.6 million. 
The corresponding estimate in my sample for acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 is 
$42.6 million. As shown in Figure 1 Panel D, the median conditional NOLC at the start of my 
sample period in 1995 is $16 million. The mean is $33 million.  
6.5 Conclusions 
 This chapter provides details of the design of my empirical models, my sample selection 
procedure, and the summary statistics of the variables I use in my tests. In the following chapter, 
I report the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) which correspond with my first and second 














Chapter 7. Empirical Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
7.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I discuss the results of the empirical tests of my hypotheses. Section 7.2 
focuses on my first hypothesis which predicts that there is a positive association between the 
target’s federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) and acquisition premium and that this 
association is increasing in the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. To test this hypothesis, I estimate 
equation (1) reported in Chapter 6 and I discuss the baseline results in section 7.2.1 below. In 
section 7.2.2, I report the results from additional analyses that consider the target’s valuation 
allowance. 
 In section 7.3, I discuss the results of the empirical test for my second hypothesis which 
predicts that the probability of debt financing is relatively lower if the target has a federal NOLC. 
The baseline results, reported in section 7.3.1, correspond with equation (2) from Chapter 6. In 
section 7.3.2 I examine the NOLC-debt association in response to the credit supply shock during 
2007-2009 financial crisis. This provides a unique setting because the credit supply shock provides 
an exogenous source of cross-sectional variation in the availability of debt that affects some 
acquirers more than others. I conclude with a chapter summary in section 7.4.  
7.2 Test of Hypothesis 1 
7.2.1 Baseline Results 
  Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between the target’s federal net operating loss 
carryforward (NOLC) and acquisition premium that is increasing in the acquirer’s marginal tax 
rate (MTR). The baseline test of hypothesis 1 is reported in Column (1) of Table 2. The coefficient 
on 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅 captures the effect of the acquirer’s MTR on acquisition premium for deals in which 
the target does not have an NOLC. I do not have any a priori expectations for the sign or magnitude 
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of this coefficient. The reported coefficient of -0.061 is not statistically different from zero. The 
coefficient on 𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 captures the effect of the target’s NOLC on acquisition premium for 
deals in which the acquirer is not taxable (i.e., the acquirer’s MTR is zero). The reported coefficient 
of -0.015 is not statistically different from zero. The coefficient on 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 captures 
the effect of the target’s NOLC on premium conditioning on the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. The 
coefficient is 0.132 (p<0.10 one-tailed). 
 To provide an economic estimate of the premium per dollar of NOLC, I calculate the partial 
derivative of the regression equation with respect to 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 conditioning on values of 𝑀𝑇𝑅. I 
estimate that a fully taxable acquirer (with an MTR of 35%) pays $0.031 per dollar of the target’s 
NOLC. I observe an insignificant premium at an MTR of 0% and 17.5%. The evidence supports 
hypothesis 1 that acquirers with higher marginal tax rates pay larger premiums for NOLCs. 
 The sign and significance of the coefficients on the control variables are generally 
consistent with prior literature. The positive coefficient on the acquirer’s Q Ratio (Q) is consistent 
with prior evidence that overvalued acquirers pay larger premiums (Fu, Lin, and Officer 2013). 
The coefficients on the target’s intangible assets (Intangibles) and research and development 
expenditures (R&D) are significantly positive. This evidence is consistent with the argument that 
uncertainty regarding the future cash flows of intangible assets creates asymmetric information 
between the firm and the market, and that acquirers choosing to engage in acquisitions value these 
assets higher than the stock market (Laamanen 2007). The coefficient on EBITDA_SD is negative, 
suggesting that targets with risky investment are associated with lower premiums.  
 Finally, I find that target shareholders’ capital gains liability affects acquisition premium. 
As compared to ordinary investors, institutional investors are more likely to be tax exempt. In 
column (1), the coefficient on Taxable * CG is significantly positive, while the coefficient on 
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Taxable * CG * InstOwn is significantly negative. This evidence is consistent with Ayers et al. 
(2003).  
7.2.2 Additional Analyses 
 Acquisition premium is the excess of the offer price over the target’s pre-offer share price 
that an acquirer relies upon to determine its initial bid. In Section 3.2, I argue that a positive 
premium indicates that 1) the target’s shareholders previously discounted the value of the NOLC, 
and that 2) the acquisition creates value by transferring the NOLC to a firm that is better able to 
use it. In this section, I provide direct tests of these assumptions. 
 Hayn (1989) argues that the extent to which a firm’s NOLC is reflected in its price depends 
on investors’ prior probabilities that the firm will realize the tax benefit of the NOLC taking into 
account the expected timing of NOL use and the firm’s marginal tax rate.35 If the target is fully 
taxable and faces the maximum corporate marginal tax rate, the amount of its NOLC that is 
capitalized is equal to the discounted product of the NOLC and the 35% marginal tax rate.  
 Provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS No. 109), now 
part of Accounting Standards Codification Section 740 (ASC 740), require managers to estimate 
the future realization of an NOLC based on expectations of future income and to offset the tax-
effected amount of the NOLC recorded in the deferred tax asset with a valuation allowance (VA) 
to the extent that it is “more likely than not” that the tax asset will expire unrealized. The VA 
provides a source of cross-sectional variation in the NOLC value capitalized in targets’ pre-
acquisition stock prices. 
                                                          
35 The amount of the NOLC capitalized is also a function of the various alternatives through which the NOLC can be 
utilized taking into account their probabilities. For instance, the firm can sell depreciable assets that have appreciated 
in value and use its NOLC to offset the resulting tax. It is unlikely, however, that the firm could fully obtain the tax-
benefit of its NOLC through asset sales. Another method that firms use to maximize the value of their NOLC is to 
shift income around changes in tax rules (e.g., Maydew 1997; Erickson, Heitzman, and Zhang 2013). 
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 Prior studies document that both the NOLC and the VA are value-relevant. Givoly and 
Hayn (1992) and Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018) provide evidence that the market 
reprices firms’ NOLCs in response to federal corporate tax rate changes. Using an event study, 
Kumar and Visvanathan (2003) document that initial VA disclosures are associated with negative 
abnormal returns.36 This suggests that the amount of a target’s NOLC that is capitalized in its pre-
acquisition price is conditional on the markets’ expectation of the realization of the tax benefit. 
 Prior research shows that markets anticipate acquisitions and impound the expected value 
of potential synergies into stock prices before an acquisition takes place. Song and Walkling (2000) 
find evidence of positive abnormal returns to rivals of initial acquisition targets. The evidence on 
whether the market impounds the NOLC tax benefit in anticipation of an acquisition is mixed (e.g., 
Hayn 1989; Haw et al. 1987; Plummer and Robinson 1990; Crawford and Lechner 1996).  
 The effect of acquisition anticipation is heterogeneous. Consider a target whose NOLC tax 
benefit is not fully impounded in its pre-acquisition price due to the prior disclosure of a VA. An 
acquisition by a taxable acquirer creates value because the transfer of the tax asset increases the 
probability that the future tax benefit will be realized. Absent any acquisition anticipation related 
price-adjustment, a positive premium will be observed if the acquirer is taxable. If the market 
anticipates the acquisition, however, the tax benefit will be at least partially capitalized leading up 
to the acquisition. A positive (negative) premium will be observed if partial capitalization is less 
than (greater than) the post-acquisition NPV of the NOLC taking into account the acquirer’s 
marginal tax rate and the §382 loss limit.  
                                                          
36 There is debate as to whether the VA is value-relevant. Although there is some evidence that managers use discretion 
within accounting standards to manage earnings (e.g., Frank and Rego 2006), most of the evidence suggests that this 
is not the case and that VA disclosures are credible (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2013). See Edwards (2018) for evidence on 
the information content of the valuation allowance in debt markets. 
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 The expectation is different for a target whose NOLC is fully impounded in its pre-
acquisition price. Due to the applicability of §382, an acquisition reduces the NPV of the tax 
benefit and this effect is larger if the acquirer is not taxable.37 In this scenario, the acquisition 
premium is negative because the pre-acquisition capitalization is greater than the value of the 
acquisition offer. If, however, the market discounts the NOLC’s value in anticipation of an 
acquisition, a positive premium will be observed.   
 In either scenario, no premium will be observed if the market correctly anticipates the 
NOLC’s post acquisition value. For this to occur, the market would have to correctly anticipate 
the marginal tax rate of the acquirer and the applicable §382 loss limit. This is unlikely. 
 To test whether the NOLC-premium association varies with the target’s valuation 
allowance, I estimate equation (1) on two sub-samples: 1) deals in which the target’s disclosed 
valuation allowance (VA) exceeds its tax-effected federal NOLC (VA = 1; n = 474), and deals in 
which the target either has not disclosed a VA or the target has disclosed a VA but the VA is less 
than its tax-effected federal NOLC (VA = 0; n = 554).38 
 For the subsample VA=1, I report the results in column (2) of Table 2. The estimate 
suggests that, conditional on the target disclosing a VA, an acquirer with an MTR of 35% pays 
$0.026 per dollar of the target’s NOLC. This is slightly less than the estimate of $0.031 reported 
                                                          
37 Although the limitation applies to all targets with an NOLC, deals in which the target has disclosed a VA are less 
sensitive to the §382 rules because the NOLC-benefit has already been discounted. 
38 As discussed in section 2.3, the amount recorded in the DTA (i.e., the tax-effected NOLC) is equal to the gross 
NOLC multiplied by the statutory corporate tax rate. To illustrate, a firm that incurs a $100 tax loss in the current year 
that it cannot carryback will record a tax benefit of $35 in the DTA. If management believes that the tax benefit of the 
NOLC will not be realized, the NOLC of $35 is offset with an equivalent valuation allowance (VA). Accordingly, I 
classify deals as VA=1 if the VA is greater than the gross NOLC multiplied by the statutory tax rate. This is a 
reasonable assumption given prior evidence that limitations on NOLCs are the primary determinant of the valuation 
allowance (Miller and Skinner 1998). Nonetheless, my proxy for the valuation allowance (VA) is subject to 
measurement error. Consider a firm whose deferred tax asset consists of a $35 million federal tax-effected NOLC and 
$100 in intangible assets. The firm records a $100 valuation allowance to offset the intangibles. My proxy for the 
valuation allowance would equal 1 because the $100 in valuation allowance is greater than the $35 million NOLC. 
But, my proxy would be incorrect because the firm has not offset any of the NOLC. In short, my proxy overstates the 
number of firms that have not offset their NOLC and understates the number of firms that have.  
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in column (1) on the full sample. The positive premium suggests that the target’s pre-acquisition 
price did not fully reflect the value of the tax-benefit and that the transfer of the tax asset to a 
taxable acquirer creates value for both parties. The target shareholders gain because they are 
partially compensated for the value of an asset that would likely have expired unused otherwise. 
The acquirer shareholders gain because the NOLC is purchased at a considerable discount.  
 For the subsample VA=0, I report the results in column (3) of Table 2. Absent a valuation 
allowance (VA = 0), the NOLC-related premium is $0.126 if the acquirer has an MTR of 35% and 
-$0.089 if the acquirer has an MTR of 0%. While the negative premium at a 0% MTR is consistent 
with my expectation, the positive premium at a 35% MTR is not. Absent a VA, the tax asset is of 
value to the target and this is reflected in its pre-acquisition price. One explanation for this is that 
the market discounted the value of the NOLC in anticipation that the firm will be acquired (and 
that §382 will be applicable), and that the positive premium reflects the target’s superior bargaining 
position in obtaining compensation for the loss in value of its NOLC.39  
 The above narrative relies on three key assumptions that can be directly tested. First, I 
assume that the amount of the NOLC previously capitalized in the target’s stock price is 
conditional on its VA. To test this, I estimate a regression on the target’s market value of equity 
as of the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the year of the acquisition announcement. 
Unlike with the premium regressions in which I scaled NOLC by the target’s pre-acquisition 
market value, here I log-transform NOLC so that the measure is unaffected by acquisition 
anticipation. I estimate this regression on the 1,003 unique target firm-years in my sample and I 
                                                          
39 Examining pre-TRA 86 acquisitions, Hayn (1989) documents that target firms generate negative NOLC-related 
returns in taxable cash-for-stock acquisitions. As discussed previously, in the pre TRA-86 period, target’s NOLCs 
were eliminated in taxable acquisitions. Based on this, Hayn concludes that the market partially capitalizes the value 
of the NOLC prior to the acquisition announcement and that this capitalization reverses upon the announcement of a 
taxable acquisition because the value of the attribute is eliminated. 
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include all target characteristics from equation (1). I report the estimate in column (1) of Table 3. 
The coefficients on NOLC_ln and on NOLC_ln*VA are 0.109 (p<0.01) and -0.105 (p<0.10), 
respectively. This confirms my assumption that the capitalization of the NOLC tax-benefit in the 
target’s stock price is relatively higher absent a VA. 
 A second key assumption I make is that there is an acquisition anticipation related price 
adjustment prior to the acquisition announcement. For targets that have not previously disclosed a 
VA, the NOLC value is already impounded into price and the anticipation of an acquisition reduces 
this capitalization because of the expected loss in the NOLC’s value due to §382. To test this, I 
estimate a regression on the % change in target’s market value between the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the year of the acquisition announcement and the date 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement. The regression is estimated as a function of the target’s NOLC 
conditioning on its VA. I report the estimate in column (2) of Table 3. The coefficient on NOLC_ln 
is -0.017 (p<0.05). This coefficient captures the acquisition anticipation related price adjustment 
for targets without a VA. The negative sign confirms my assumption that the market anticipates 
that the acquisition will reduce the value of the NOLC. The coefficient on NOLC_ln*VA is 0.04 
(p<0.05), suggesting an upward price revision for targets with a VA. This is consistent with a 
reversal of the prior VA price discount. This also suggests that targets with a VA receive a larger 
premium than the $0.026 estimate reported in column (2) of Table 2 because the value of the tax 
benefit is partially impounded prior to the acquisition.  
 Finally, I assume that the VA dictates the division of the NOLC gain/loss between the 
acquirer and target firms. If the target has a VA, the acquirer gains by purchasing the NOLC at a 
discount. Absent a VA, however, the acquirer incurs at least some of the cost of the §382-induced 
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reduction in the value of the target’s NOLC, as evidenced by the relatively larger acquisition 
premium. To test this explanation, I examine acquirer and target acquisition announcement returns.  
 For this analysis, I eliminate deals in which either the acquirer or the target is not listed on 
CRSP or has insufficient data to compute announcement returns. The sample size is reduced to 
946 deals, 420 deals for which VA=1 and 526 deals for which VA=0. I compute target (tCAR3) 
and acquirer (aCAR3) announcement returns as the log-transformation of one plus the three-day (-
1,1) cumulative abnormal return estimated using the market model where the model parameters 
are estimated in the (−210, −60) window prior to the acquisition announcement. For ease of 
interpretation, I also log-transform the target’s NOLC (NOLC_ln). I regress CAR on MTR, 
NOLC_ln, VA, and their interactions.   
 For the subsample VA=1, I report acquirer (aCAR3) and target (tCAR3) returns in Table 4 
columns (1) and (2), respectively. Conditional on the acquirer having an MTR of 35%, I estimate 
an NOLC-premium elasticity of 0.002 (p<0.10) in column (1). This evidence is consistent with my 
expectation. The acquirer, conditional on being taxable, generates a positive price response due to 
having acquired the NOLC at a significant discount. Returns to the target firm, reported in column 
(2) are not significantly different from zero.  
 For the subsample VA=0, I report acquirer (aCAR3) and target (tCAR3) returns in Table 4 
columns (3) and (4), respectively. In column (3), I estimate an NOLC-premium elasticity of -
0.0043 (p<0.01) if the acquirer has an MTR of 35%, suggesting that the acquirer absorbs some of 
the loss related to §382. The corresponding return to the target, reported in column (4), is -0.0076 
(p<0.01). The magnitude of the target’s return is nearly twice as large as that of the acquirer’s, 
suggesting that the target absorbs most of the loss in the NOLC’s value.  
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 Additionally, the results in column (4) indicate that the target firm’s return is more negative 
in deals in which the acquirer has a relatively lower MTR. In a deal in which the acquirer is not 
taxable, the estimate of the NOLC-premium elasticity of -0.0358 (p<0.01) is considerably larger 
than the elasticity of -0.0076 (p<0.01) in a deal in which the acquirer is fully taxable. This 
corroborates the evidence on acquisition premium reported in Table 2.      
7.3 Test of Hypothesis 2 
7.3.1 Baseline Results 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that the probability of debt financing is relatively lower if the target 
has a federal NOLC. To test hypothesis 2, I estimate equation (2) and report the probit coefficients 
in Table 5. The dependent variable, (>0% BankFin), takes a value of one if the acquisition is at 
least partially financed via a bank loan. The key variable of interest is 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 which takes a 
value of one if the target has a federal NOLC. H2 predicts a negative coefficient on 𝛽1. Because I 
include year and industry interactions, the probit estmation drops combinations for which there is 
no variation in debt financing.  
 I report my baseline regression results in column (1) of Table 5. The coefficient on 
𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 is -0.403 (p<0.05). At the bottom of Table 5 I present the marginal effect which I 
compute as the partial derivative of the regression equation with respect to 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑. The estimate 
suggests that, holding all other variables at their sample mean, the probability of at least a partial 
debt-financed acquisition is 6.4 percentage points lower in deals in which the target has an NOLC 
relative to deals in which the target does not have an NOLC.  
 The sign and significance of the coefficients on the control variables suggest that while 
target and deal characteristics affect the likelihood of at least partial debt-financing, the acquirer’s 
characteristics largely do not matter. This is puzzling, especially given the well-documented 
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positive association between the acquirer’s marginal tax rate and acquisition debt financing (e.g., 
Erickson 1998). One explanation for this is that my dependent variable captures any amount of 
debt financing whereas prior studies have generally modelled the choice of 100% debt financing.  
 In column (2) of Table 5, I report coefficients from a probit regression on 100% debt-
financing. The coefficient on 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 is -0.493 (p<0.01) and the corresponding marginal effect 
is 6.8 percentage points. As expected, the acquirer’s marginal tax rate (MTR) is significantly 
positively associated with 100% debt financing. The marginal estimate suggests that the 
probability of a 100% debt financed acquisition is 11 percentage points higher for a fully taxable 
acquirer (with an MTR of 35%) relative to a non-taxable acquirer (with an MTR of 0%).  
 In column (3), I restrict the sample to cash-for-stock taxable deals and compare 100% debt-
financed acquisitions to 100% cash-financed acquisitions. This test allows for a direct comparison 
with models estimated by Dhaliwal et al. (2005). The sample for this test consists of 139 
transactions of which 34 (24%) are fully debt-financed. The coefficient on 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 is -1.953 
(p<0.01). The marginal effect suggests that the target having an NOLC decreases the relative 
probability of a 100% debt-financed acquisition by 33 percentage points. In terms of the acquirer’s 
characteristics, the coefficient on PPE is positive and significant, suggesting that larger available 
collateral increases the probability of debt financing. The coefficient on Cash is negative and 
significant, suggesting that acquirers with larger cash holdings are more likely to finance with 
internal cash as opposed to debt.   
 Across all models, the sign and significance of the coefficients on the control variables are 
generally consistent with prior literature. The coefficients on Relative_Size and Deal_Size are 
positive and mostly significant, suggesting that the acquirer is more likely to obtain external 
financing when acquiring a larger target. The estimate in columns (1) suggests that higher target 
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shareholders’ capital gains liability reduces the probability of debt financing. This is because debt-
financing is associated with cash payment and this increases the probability of a taxable acquisition 
structure.  
 Under the trade-off theory, the substitutability of tax shields generates the largest benefit 
for acquirers with high marginal tax rates (i.e., tax constrained acquirers).40 To test this, I estimate 
equation (2) and interact the target’s federal NOLC (𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑) with the acquirer’s marginal tax 
rate (MTR). I report the estimation in Column (4) of Table 5. The dependent variable, (>0% 
BankFin), takes a value of one if the acquisition is at least partially financed via a bank loan. As 
expected, the reported marginal effect shows that the NOLC-debt substitution is strongest in deals 
in which the acquirer has a high marginal tax rate. For a fully taxable acquirer with an MTR of 
35%, the probability of a debt-financed acquisition is 7 percentage points lower for a deal in which 
the target has an NOLC relative to one in which it does not. The marginal estimate is reduced to 6 
(5) percentage points at an MTR of 30% (25%).  
7.3.2 Additional Analyses 
 To sharpen my inference, I examine the NOLC-debt substitution hypothesis in the presence 
of financing frictions. The 2007-2009 credit crisis provides a powerful setting. With the collapse 
of numerous banks during this period, there was an inward shift in the bank credit supply curve 
and firms responded to the credit supply shock by seeking alternative sources of financing. Studies 
document that the demand curve for bond financing shifted out in response to the contraction of 
the bank credit supply curve (e.g., Becker and Ivashina 2014; Adrian, Colla, and Shin 2012). As 
                                                          
40 Dhaliwal et al. (2005) also recognize this, but are unable to test it. In footnote 25, the authors state “recent studies 
on tax substitution effects generally specify that the effect occurs for tax constrained firms only. Because there is little 
variation in the tax rates of acquirers in our sample, tests of interaction effects are not feasible” (p 28). 
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the composition of corporate debt shifted from private to public, by early 2008 the cost of public 
debt exceeded the cost of new bank loans (De Fiore and Uhlig 2015).  
 I begin my plotting the time-series averages of debt financing and NOLCs over my sample 
period. Figure 2 plots the percentage of targets with NOLCs and the percentage of acquirers that 
at least partially issue debt to finance the acquisition. The aggregate trend for debt financing and 
NOLCs appears to be consistent with the NOLC-debt trade-off theory. There is a dip in debt 
financing and a corresponding increase in target’s with NOLCs around the end of 2007 and 
beginning of 2008. This period corresponds with the tightening of the bank credit supply. I also 
plot the time-series average NOLC of all firms listed in Compustat.41 Unlike with the NOLC of 
target firms, this aggregate NOLC of all firms does not follow an inverse trend with the debt time-
series. This suggests that the NOLC-debt trade-off observed in acquisitions is likely not due to 
chance.  
 Next, I examine the NOLC-debt association in the years surrounding the crisis while 
controlling for other determinants of debt issuance. Restricting the sample period to years 2006 
through 2009, I estimate equation (2) and interact NOLC_d with dummies for each quarter. The 
coefficients, reported in Table 6, show that the NOLC-debt substitution is strongest in the last 
quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008. This is the period during which the cost of public 
debt reached a record high. One explanation for the empirical results is that acquirers of NOLC 
target firms had previously relied on bond financing as opposed to bank financing. Firms that 
borrow in public debt markets differ from those that borrow in private debt markets (Denis and 
Mihov 2003) and it is costly and sometimes not possible to shift between the two markets (Adrian 
et al. 2012). 
                                                          
41 This is based on the aggregate NOLC (Compustat mnemonic = tlcf). I remove observations with missing values.  
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 Accordingly, this suggests that as the cost of bond financing rises, acquirers that previously 
relied on bond markets are more likely to substitute to NOLC tax shields. To test this empirically, 
I estimate a regression of the acquirer’s choice of tax shield as a function of its access to bond 
financing. Following Adrian et al. (2012), I use bond ratings as a proxy for access to bond markets. 
I compute a dummy (Rated) equal to one if the acquirer has a bond rating. I estimate the model for 
a subsample of 66 acquisitions that are announced in either 2007 or 2008.  
 I report the probit regression coefficients in Table 7. In column (1), the coefficient on Rated 
is 0.961 (p<0.01). The marginal estimate indicates that the probability of acquiring a target with 
an NOLC is 17.5 percentage points higher for an acquirer with a credit rating relative to an acquirer 
without a credit rating. In column (2), I include acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects. The 
coefficient on Rated is 3.406 (p<0.01) and the corresponding marginal effect of 44 percentage 
points is economically large.  
 In column (3), I include acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects and I interact Rated 
with the acquirer’s marginal tax rate (MTR). Because the NOLC-debt substitution is strongest 
when acquirer has a high marginal tax rate, I expect high MTR acquirers with a credit rating to 
have the highest relative probability of acquiring a target with an NOLC. The marginal effect 
reported in column (3) suggests that among fully taxable acquirers (with an MTR of 35%) the 
probability of acquiring a target with an NOLC is 50 percentage points higher if the acquirer has 
a credit rating.  
 The findings are in line with my prediction. As the cost of bond financing rises, acquirers 
that previously relied on bond markets are more likely to substitute to NOLC tax shields. This 




7.4 Empirical Limitations 
 My tests of H1 and H2 are subject to limitations. To the extent that my proxy for the target’s 
NOLC is correlated with the error term, the reported regression coefficients are biased. A standard 
method to overcome this limitation is to find an instrument that is correlated with tax status, but 
uncorrelated with the error in the structural equation. Finding good instruments for tax status is 
difficult because variables that affect NOLC generally also affect acquisition premium. Larcker 
and Rusticus (2010) demonstrate that instrumental variable (IV) estimates often perform worse 
than OLS, suggesting that implementing a credible IV method is very difficult.  
 I partially address this limitation by controlling for target firm characteristics that prior 
research finds to be associated with NOLCs and by including industry and year interactions. 
Additionally, the cross-sectional tests of interactions with the acquirer’s marginal tax rate largely 
rule out the possibility of the alternative explanation that my NOLC proxy is capturing a different 
firm characteristic, such as growth prospects. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that I cannot completely 
rule out the possibility of correlated omitted variables. 
 A second limitation of my tests is that my empirical models do not account for the fact that 
acquisitions are not random events (e.g., Song and Walkling 2000). Firms may self-select into 
M&A deals and this could lead to biased coefficients if firms’ propensity to enter into M&A deals 
is correlated with tax status. The interrelation between takeover likelihood and premium may lead 
to a nonrandom sample, and the inability to observe premium for firms that are not acquired creates 
a censoring problem.42 This bias can be addressed by using Heckman’s (1979) two-step selection 
                                                          
42 There is also a selection problem relating to the bidders in my sample. Firms choose an optimal capital structure 
that balances the benefits and costs of debt. If some potential bidders do not bid due to the high offsetting costs of debt 
(i.e., financial distress and the related loss of corporate control), my results may understate the effect of the 
determinants of debt financing. Consider two types of firms. Those that benefit from additional debt issuance and 
those that don’t. If the occurrence of each type of firm in my sample of bidders were proportionate to what is observed 
in the population, then no sample selection bias would be present and OLS would produce unbiased coefficients. This 
would be the case if selection into the sample of bidders (i.e., the propensity to undertake an acquisition) was 
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model. The estimation requires data on all variables in my models for all firms, including those 
that are not acquired. Because NOLC data is hand-collected from 10-k filings, this solution is not 
practical for my setting. Accordingly, I acknowledge that firms that enter into M&A deals differ 
from firms that do that and that my findings may have limited out-of-sample generalization.  
7.5 Conclusions 
 In summary, the evidence in this chapter provides empirical support for my two 
hypotheses. In support of H1, I document a positive association between the target firm’s NOLC 
and acquisition premium that is increasing in acquirer’s marginal tax rate. Additionally, I 
document that the division of the NOLC-related tax benefit between the acquiring and target firms 
is conditional on the VA. Taken together, the results provide new insight into whether and to what 
extent NOLCs are valued in corporate acquisitions, and how the potential tax-benefit is divided 
between the parties.  
 In support of H2, I document that acquirers trade-off the present value of potential interest 
tax-shields with the present value of the target’s NOLC. In addition, I document that the magnitude 
of the NOLC-debt trade-off increases with the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. This evidence is 
consistent with tax-constrained firms benefiting the most from substituting between tax shields. 
Finally, I document that non-debt tax shields are most valuable when the supply of credit is limited. 
Collectively, my results provide strong evidence that debt and non-debt tax shields are 
substitutable.  
   
  
                                                          
independent of capital structure (e.g., the propensity to issue debt). If firms that benefit less from additional debt 
issuance are less likely to be in my sample because they are less likely to undertake an acquisition, then my sample 
disproportionately over-represents bidders that do not benefit from additional debt issuance, either because they are 
tax-exhausted or the offsetting costs of debt are high. 
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Chapter 8. The effect of §382 Loss Limitation Rules on Acquisition Completion 
8.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I provide empirical tests for the effects of the §382 loss limitation rules in 
acquisitions. In section 8.2, I discuss the relevant institutional details and provide a prediction for 
the effect of §382 loss limitation rules on the probability of acquisition completion. I report the 
results of my tests in sections 8.3 and 8.4. Section 8.5 concludes with a summary. 
8.2 Institutional Setting and Research Design 
 Loss limitation rules under §382 of the Internal Revenue Code restrict the use of a 
corporation’s tax losses if the corporation undergoes an ownership change. The annual loss limit 
is computed as the fair market value (MV) of the target at the time of ownership change multiplied 
by the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate (FLTR).  
 The key institutional detail here is that the loss limit is computed as of the date of ownership 
change which coincides with the date that the acquisition is completed. Accordingly, the applicable 
loss-limit is not known with certainty on the date of the offer which precedes the ownership change 
date.43 The implication is that the loss-limit may change between the date of the offer and the date 
that the transaction closes (or is withdrawn). A higher (lower) loss limit corresponds with a higher 
(lower) post-acquisition NPV of the target’s NOLC. Accordingly, I predict that a drop in the loss 
limit between the date of the offer (i.e., the initial acquisition announcement date) and the date of 
closing will reduce the probability that a deal closes.  
 I compute the change in the loss limit as: 
                                                          
43 Some firms explicitly state that there is uncertainty on the applicable §382 loss limit. In its schedule 13D, filed on 
December 27, 1994, 21st Century Insurance Group (formerly 20th Century Holdings) states: 
 
Because the value of the Company's stock, as well as the federal long-term tax-exempt rate, fluctuate, it is impossible 
to predict with any accuracy the annual limitation upon the amount of taxable income of the Company that could be 
offset by such NOLs or other items were an ownership change to occur. 
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𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = [(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) - (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)]      (3) 
where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and 
the target’s market value, both computed as of the date on which the transaction closes. The closing 
date is the date on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 
𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement date.
44 
 I estimate the following probit model to test whether a drop in the loss limit reduces the 
probability that the deal is completed: 
Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀          (4) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 is equal to one if the transaction is completed and zero if it is withdrawn. For 
ease of interpretation, I convert 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 to a dummy variable equal to one if it has a 
negative value (i.e., a loss-limit drop). I log transform the gross dollar amount of the NOLC 
because doing so allows for estimating conditional probabilities that are unaffected by the target 
firm’s size. The assumption in equation (4) is that the sensitivity of deal completion to a drop in 
the loss limit is increasing in the size of the potential tax benefit.   
 I control for variables that likely affect the outcome. Deal characteristics include whether 
the deal is a tender offer (Tender), the presence of competing bidders (Competition), within 
industry merger (Horizontal Deal), accounting treatment (Pooling), the relative size of the target 
(Relative Size), and deal size (Deal Size). I control for financing (AllStock) and (>0% Debt). I 
include the target firms’ initial market reaction to the acquisition announcement (tCAR3) to control 
                                                          
44 As discussed previously, the base §382 calculation is adjusted for other factors. The inability to observe all potential 
adjustments may lead to some measurement error in computing the loss limit. The change in the loss limit, however, 
is less subject to this potential measurement error because it is unlikely that the adjustment factors materially change 
between the two dates. The mean (median) deal in the sample closes within 3.5 (3) months of the initial announcement 




for any announcement induced shift in the target’s market value that may affect the change in the 
loss limit. I also include the acquirers’ initial market reaction to the acquisition announcement 
(aCAR3) to capture potential synergies.  
 Studies find that targets’ financial reporting quality is an important determinant of 
acquisition completion (e.g., Skaife and Wangerin 2012; Amel-Zadeh and Zhang 2015). I include 
an indicator if the target received an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) at 
any time in the previous 5 years.45 I further control for the target’s information environment with 
the number of analysts following the firm (Analyst) and analyst forecast error (Forecast_Error). 
Finally, I include the target’s Q Ratio (Q) which measures the quality of the target’s management 
(e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walking 1989; Servaes 1991). For acquirer characteristics, I include Tobin’s 
Q (Q) and institutional ownership (InstOwn) to control for deal quality, and the marginal tax rate 
(MTR) to capture the importance of the NOLC to the acquirer.  
 For this test, I restrict the sample to deals in which the target has an NOLC and the NOLC 
is greater than the announcement date loss limit (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒).
46 This leaves 
a sample of 585 transactions. The sample is further reduced because announcement years 2013 
and 2015 have no variation in deal completion. The useable sample for this test consists of 489 
transactions. Panel A of Table 8 provides summary statistics of key variables used in the tests in 
this section. The change in the target’s loss limit (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑) is negative in 16% of 
deals.  
                                                          
45 AAERs are commonly used in the literature as a proxy for accounting misconduct. Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 
(2004) provide descriptive evidence that 29 firms subject to AAERs paid taxes on their fraudulently overstated 
earnings. This directly impacts the NOLC through the future reversal of the tax liability. 




 In Panel B of Table 8, I classify each of the 489 transactions into one of the following four 
groups: 1) Completed = 1 & 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 = 1 (n = 58), 2) Completed = 0 & 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 = 1 (n = 21), 3) Completed = 1 & 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 = 0 (n = 374), 
and 4) Completed = 0 &  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 = 0 (n = 36). In Panel C, I provide a cross-
tabulation of bank financing (>0% BankFin) and bond financing (BondFin). 
8.3 Results – Acquisition Completion 
 I report the estimation of equation (4) in column (1) of Table 9. The model includes 
acquisition announcement year and target industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects. Marginal effects, 
reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the regression equation 
with respect to Target_Δ382Limit_d conditioning on values of NOLC_ln. The marginal estimate 
suggests that at an NOLC of $50 million (which approximates the median deal in the sample), a 
drop in the loss limit reduces the relative probability of completion by 7.7 percentage points. The 
effect of a drop in the loss limit on deal completion increases with the size of the NOLC. At an 
NOLC of $500 million, a drop in the loss limit reduces the relative probability of completion by 
14.4 percentage points.47  
 In column (2) of Table 9, I include announcement year by target industry (1-digit SIC) 
interactions. This reduces the sample from 489 to 277 transactions. Relative to deals with an 
increase in the loss limit, a decrease in the loss limit reduces the conditional probability of 
completion by 14.8 (30.3) percentage points in a deal in which the target has an NOLC of $50 
($500) million.  
                                                          
47 The change in the loss limit (Target_Δ382Limit) is affected by the change in the target’s market value of equity and 
the change in federal long-term tax exempt rate (FLTR). In untabulated tests, I decompose Target_Δ382Limit into the 
change in market value and the change in the FLTR. Regression estimates suggest that the effect of a drop in market 
value on deal completion is 3-6 times larger than the effect of a drop in the FLTR on deal completion, depending on 
the specification and magnitude of the NOLC. This is not surprising given that, conditional on a drop in market value, 
the average target’s value drops by nearly 18%, while conditional on a drop in the FLTR, the average drop in FLTR 
is only 5%, on average.  
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 In columns (3) and (4), I replace Target_Δ382Limit_d with Target_Δ382Limit_% * -1, 
which is equal to Target_Δ382Limit scaled by (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) and multiplied by 
negative one. Column (3) includes acquisition announcement year and target industry (1-digit SIC) 
fixed effects. Column (4) includes announcement year by target industry (1-digit SIC) interactions. 
I plot conditional probabilities from column (4) in Figure 3. Panels A and B depict the conditional 
probability of completion at 25% and 50% changes in the loss limit. The figures show that the 
probability of completion conditional on a drop in the loss limit decreases with the size of the 
NOLC, suggesting that §382 loss limitation rules are of greater significance in deals with relatively 
larger tax-incentives. The figures also depict that an increase in the loss limit does not significantly 
affect the likelihood of completion, suggesting that changes in the loss limit are asymmetric with 
respect to increases and decreases.   
 The results from these analyses suggest that, by requiring that the loss limit be computed 
as of the deal closing date, §382 imposes a significant cost on acquisitions in which the target firm 
has an NOLC. The effect of a drop in the loss limit on deal completion is economically 
significant.48   
8.4 Additional Analyses 
8.4.1 Tax Shield Substitution and Acquisition Completion 
 In this section, I provide evidence for a specific tax-planning activity that an acquirer can 
undertake to re-balance its optimal tax plan in response to a drop in the loss limit. In Chapter 7, I 
                                                          
48 A potential alternative to cancelling the deal is for the acquirer to renegotiate the terms of the offer. Skaife and 
Wangerin (2013) argue that the acquirer can use private information that it obtains during the due diligence process 
of the M&A transaction to renegotiate the initial offer. Empirically, the authors document that deals in which the target 
firm has low financial reporting quality, the acquirer is more likely to be renegotiate the terms of the deal to pay a 
lower price. Of the 489 deals in my sample, 19 deals are renegotiated to a lower price and 18 of these deals are 
subsequently completed. In an untabulated test, I estimate equation (4) replacing the dependent variable equal to one 
for deals that are renegotiated to a lower price. The results suggest that the probability of renegotiation is relatively 
higher in deals in which the loss limit drops and that this effect is stronger in deals in which the NOLC is larger. 
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document that acquirers are less likely to obtain bank financing for acquisitions of targets with 
NOLCs. This prediction, and the related empirical evidence, can be extended by examining 
acquirers’ public debt issuance in between the announcement and closing dates. A drop in the loss 
limit corresponds with a lower post-acquisition NPV of the target’s NOLC. If, as predicted by my 
second hypothesis, tax shields are substitutable then the acquirer can at least partially reduce the 
negative tax effect of a drop in the loss limit by issuing bonds. This, in turn, should at least partially 
offset the effect of a drop in the loss limit on deal completion.  
 Testing this requires the estimation of two equations. Because the decision to issue debt 
and to complete the acquisition are likely not independent (i.e., autocorrelation between error 
terms), I estimate the following two probit models jointly using a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) model that applies the generalized least squares estimator (Zellner 1962): 
Pr(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑛) = 𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝑍 + 𝜀   (5) 
 
Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛾7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀 (6) 
 
Where BondFin equals one for deals in which the acquirer issues bonds between the announcement 
and closing dates.49 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 equals one if the change in the target’s §382 loss limit 
is negative. All other variables are as previously defined. Both equations include main effects and 
lower order interactions. I include announcement year and acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered by acquirer’s industry (1-digit SIC). 
 The regressions results are reported in Table 10. For ease of interpretation, I plot 
conditional probabilities in Figure 4. In Panel A, marginal effects are computed as the partial 
derivative of equation (5) with respect to Target_Δ382Limit_d conditioning on values of 
NOLC_ln. The graph suggests that the probability of issuing bonds, conditional on a drop in the 
                                                          
49 I obtain data on acquirers’ public bond issues from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD).  
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loss limit, is relatively higher at larger values of NOLC. In Panel B, marginal effects are computed 
as the partial derivative of equation (6) with respect to BondFin conditioning on values of 
Target_Δ382Limit_d and of NOLC_ln. Conditional on a drop in the loss limit 
(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 = 1), the probability of deal completion is significantly higher for 
acquirers that issue bonds relative to those that do not. The effect size is economically large. For 
loss limit increases (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 = 0), bond issuance has no significant impact on deal 
completion.  
 Consistent with my predictions, the results suggest that 1) acquirers offset the effect of a 
drop in the loss limit by issuing bonds (and that this effect is stronger the larger the NOLC), and 
2) the issuance of bonds offsets the negative effect of a drop in the loss limit on acquisition 
completion.  
 The findings suggest that the NOLC-debt trade-off also applies in public debt markets. The 
findings also provide some support for the argument that acquisitions are not tax-motivated. Given 
the growing trend in loss firms, arguably it would be more cost-efficient for a tax-motivated 
acquirer to abandon a transaction and seek another target than to incur additional costs associated 
with debt issuance. The willingness of acquirers to issue additional debt and thus complete the 
acquisition suggests that there are likely other sources of synergies associated with the acquisition. 
8.4.2 Time to Deal Completion 
 Holding all else constant, the most cost-efficient way to protect against the negative 
consequences of §382 is to time the completion of the acquisition to coincide with a more favorable 
loss-limit. To test this, I estimate the following probit model: 
 Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑|𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ ≤ 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 +
 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀       (7) 
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Where (Completed | month ≤ 1) equals 1 if the deal is completed either in the same month or in 
the month subsequent to the initial acquisition offer. Target_382limit_AnnDate is the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the target’s acquisition announcement date §382 loss limit (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 
𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒). I include announcement year and acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered by acquirer industry (1-digit SIC).  
 If acquisitions are timed to correspond with a favorable loss limit, then I expect a positive 
coefficient on 𝛽3. I report the results in Table 11. The coefficients on 𝛽1 and 𝛽3 are -0.117 (p<0.01) 
and 0.189 (p<0.01), respectively. Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are 
computed as the partial derivative of equation (7) with respect to Target_382limit_AnnDate 
conditioning on values of NOLC_ln. The estimates suggest that when the loss-limit is favorable, 
the acquirer is more likely to complete the acquisition within one month of the initial acquisition 
offer if the target’s NOLC is large.  
8.5 Conclusions 
 The tests and related discussion in this chapter provide some insight into the consequences 
of loss limitation rules. As previously discussed, the §382 rules are intended to discourage tax 
motivated acquisitions. The evidence on the asymmetric effect of loss limit changes, however, is 
not consistent with this purpose. If acquisitions were tax-motivated, then an increase in the loss-
limit would increase the conditional probability of completion. Examining this evidence in light 
of the evidence on the NOLC-debt substitution, the findings collectively suggest that acquirers 
structure acquisitions to obtain the maximum tax-benefit taking into consideration the potential 
costs. A drop in the loss-limit alters this equilibrium by reducing the expected tax-benefit. Taken 




Chapter 9. The Effect of the Acquirer’s NOLC on the Medium of Exchange and on 
Acquisition Completion 
9.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I examine the effect of the acquirer’s net operating loss carryforward 
(NOLC) on deal structure and on the probability of completion. For these tests, I obtain the 
acquirers’ NOLC from Compustat and retain observations with non-missing values only. A 
limitation of this analysis is that Compustat reports only the aggregate net operating loss.50 I 
examine the effect of the acquirer’s NOLC on the medium of exchange in section 9.2 and on the 
probability of deal completion conditional on the change in the §382 loss limit in section 9.3. In 
section 9.4, I discuss aggregate time-series trends in NOLCs and the medium of exchange. Section 
9.5 concludes. 
9.2 The Effect of the Acquirer’s NOLC on the Medium of Exchange – Firm Level Evidence 
 In Chapter 4 section 4.3, I discuss the determinants of the medium of exchange in corporate 
acquisitions. The literature has recognized four key determinants: asymmetric information, agency 
costs, capital structure, and target shareholders’ capital gains tax liability. With few exceptions, 
prior studies have largely overlooked the corporate tax incentive for the medium of exchange.51 
 Stock issuance increases the acquirer’s risk of triggering a §382 ownership change of its 
own stock. This is especially costly for an acquirer with a substantial loss carryforward. Erickson 
(1998) notes that several of the acquiring firms with NOLCs in his sample explicitly disclose that 
they are opting for taxable cash acquisitions to avoid the potential of triggering an ownership 
change under §382. Erickson’s (1998) sample includes acquisitions completed between 1985 and 
                                                          
50 The aggregate NOLC consists of federal, state, and foreign tax loss carryforwards.  
51 Exceptions include studies that examine the tax incentive for step-up structures (e.g., Erickson 1998).  
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1988. Because NOLCs have grown exponentially since then, it is reasonable to assume that so has 
the disincentive for stock payment.52 
 I estimate the following probit model to test whether acquirers with NOLCs are less likely 
to issue stock in acquisitions that may trigger an §382 ownership change: 
𝑃𝑟(𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_382_𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹_𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋 + 𝜀    (8) 
where Acquirer_382_Trigger is equal to one if the estimated value of the stock consideration in 
the deal is equal to at least 50% of the acquirer’s market value 4 weeks prior to the acquisition 
announcement.53 TLCF_d equals one if the acquirer has an NOLC and 0 if it does not. The 
coefficient on 𝛽1 captures the conditional probability of an §382-triggering stock payment for 
acquirers with NOLCs relative to acquirers without. 
 I report results in Table 12. Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are 
computed as the partial derivative of the regression equation with respect to TLCF_d. The estimate 
in column (1) includes announcement year and acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects. The 
coefficient on 𝛽1 is -0.517 (p<0.05). The marginal effect suggests that having an NOLC reduces 
the relative probability of triggering an §382 ownership change by 4 percentage points. In column 
(2), I include announcement year by acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) interactions. The marginal 
                                                          
52 Searching through SEC filings, I note a number of firms that explicitly discuss the costs associated with §382. In its 
form S-4, filed on November 20, 2014, Engility Holdings states:  
 
Under Section 382 of the Code, if a corporation undergoes an “ownership change” as defined in that section, the 
corporation’s ability to use its pre-change NOLs and other pre-change tax attributes to offset its post-change income 
may become subject to significant limitations. As a result, it may be more difficult for New Engility to be acquired or 
to engage in strategic acquisitions because such transactions could result in the loss of New Engility’s NOLs and other 
tax attributes. For example, New Engility’s ability to use equity as consideration in a strategic transaction may be 
limited because such an equity issuance could result in an ownership change. If an ownership change were to occur, 
New Engility’s ability to use any NOLs and certain other tax attributes existing at that time could be significantly 
limited. 
53 This measure is adopted from Erickson et al. (2019). 
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effect suggests that having an NOLC reduces the relative probability of triggering an §382 
ownership change by 15.2 percentage points.  
 The results provide empirical support for anecdotes that acquirers with loss carryforwards 
are less likely to pay with stock if the value of the stock is large enough to trigger an ownership 
change.  
9.3 The Effect of the Acquirer’s NOLC on Acquisition Completion  
 In this section, I document that the potential for §382 loss restrictions on the acquirer’s 
NOLC affects the probability of deal completion.  I estimate the following probit model: 
Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_382_𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 +
𝛽𝑘𝑋 + 𝜀             (9) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 equals one if the transaction is completed and zero if it is withdrawn. TLCF_ln 
is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the acquirer’s aggregate net operating loss carryforward. 
Acquirer_382_Trigger is equal to one if the estimated value of the stock consideration in the deal 
is equal to at least 50% of the acquirer’s market value 4 weeks prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d is equal to one if the change in the acquirer’s §382 loss 
limit is negative.54 All variables are defined in Appendix C. Equation (9) includes main effects and 
lower-order interactions, and announcement year and acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered by acquirer industry (1-digit SIC). 
 I report the results of the estimation in Table 13 column (1). Marginal effects, reported at 
the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of equation (9) with respect to 
Acquirer_382_Trigger conditioning on values of Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d and TLCF_ln. For the 
mean acquirer (with an NOLC of $500 million), a decrease in the §382 loss limit 
                                                          
54 I use equation (3) to compute the acquirer’s loss limit. I replace MV with the acquirer’s market value.  
74 
 
(Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d = 1) reduces the probability of completion by 13 percentage points in 
deals that potentially trigger a §382 ownership change relative to deals that do not.  
 In column (2) of Table 13, I replace Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d with Acquirer_Δ382Limit_% 
* -1, which is equal to % change in the acquirer’s §382 loss limit multiplied by negative one. I plot 
the conditional probability of completion in Figure 5. The graph shows that, conditional on a 50% 
drop in the loss limit, the probability of completion is significantly lower in deals that potentially 
trigger a §382 ownership change relative to deals that do not. This effect is increasing in the size 
of the acquirer’s NOLC. The graph also depicts that the effect of an increase in the loss limit is 
relatively small, suggesting that changes in the loss limit are asymmetric with respect to increases 
and decreases. 
9.4 The Effect of the Acquirer’s NOLC on the Medium of Exchange – Aggregate Evidence 
 Boone, Lie, and Liu (2014) examine the distribution of stock and cash payments over time 
and note that beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s there is a decline in all-stock deals in 
favor of all-cash deals. They note that the traditionally studied determinants of the medium of 
exchange are unable to explain this shift. 
 In light of the evidence in this chapter, I propose that that §382 loss limitation rules can at 
least partially explain this phenomenon. In all-stock deals, the acquirer risks triggering an 
ownership change of its stock and this is especially costly if it has a large NOLC. Given the 
complexity of §382, it is not uncommon for firms to trigger a §382 ownership change 
unexpectedly. This disincentive for all-stock deals is even stronger considering the additional costs 
associated with stock payment. Studies consistently document that stock payment is associated 
with significantly negative announcement returns for the acquirer (e.g., Travlos 1987; Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller 2002).  
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 In Panel A of Figure 6, I plot the time-series distribution of all-stock and all-cash deals and 
the percentage of acquirers with NOLCs in my sample. The figure shows that the decreased 
propensity of all-stock deals coincides with the increase in the percent of acquirers with NOLCs 
beginning in the early 2000s. Aggregating the data at announcement year, the correlation between 
the percent of acquirers with an NOLC and the percent of all-stock deals is -0.93 (p<0.001). The 
correlation of NOLC with all-cash deals is 0.80 (p<0.001).  
 In Panel B of Figure 6, I plot the time-series distribution of all-stock and all-cash deals and 
the percent of acquirers with NOLCs for acquisitions of Canadian target firms by Canadian 
acquirers. There is no observed shift between all-stock and all-cash deals. There are key 
institutional differences between the U.S. and Canadian tax codes’ treatment of NOLCs in 
acquisitions.55 In the U.S., the anti-avoidance rules are triggered if there is a 50 percent change in 
a corporation’s stock. In Canada, the triggering event is the acquisition of 50% voting control.56 
More importantly, however, Canada does not have an equivalent §382 loss limit. Following an 
acquisition of control, a loss can be carried over and applied unrestricted to income from the same 
or a similar business.57   
9.5 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I provide evidence on the importance of the acquirer’s NOLC in corporate 
acquisitions. I begin by documenting that acquirers with NOLCs are less likely to pay with stock 
                                                          
55 See Donnelly and Young (2002) for a comprehensive discussion on the difference in tax loss treatment between 
Canada and the U.S. 
56 There are some exceptions. For instance, the triggering event is deemed to have not occurred if control is acquired 
by a related taxpayer. See subsection 256(7) of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) as amended.  
57 In Canada, if the acquirer obtains less than 50% of the voting shares of the target, no triggering event is deemed to 
have occurred and the acquirer can use the target’s tax loss without restriction even if the “similar business” 
requirement is not met. Among others, Donnelly and Young (2002) argue that the 50% voting control threshold is 
unjust because all equity owners, and not just voting shareholders, are beneficiaries of a corporation’s tax loss. As 
discussed by Donnelly and Young (2002), some tax practitioners advocate that tax neutrality would be better achieved 
if Canada were to adopt the U.S. version of anti-avoidance rules, including loss limitation rules. The evidence in this 
chapter does not support this policy option to achieve tax neutrality. This may be of interest to future research. 
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consideration if doing so has the potential to trigger an ownership change under §382. Next, I 
document that acquirers that pay with stock are exposed to additional costs. Deals are more likely 
to be withdrawn if the change in the acquirer’s loss limit becomes unfavorable. Collectively, my 
tests provide a plausible explanation for the shift in the early 2000s from all-stock to all-cash deals. 
Using aggregate data, I show not only that the shift coincided with the increase in firms reporting 
NOLCS, but also that the propensity for all-stock (all-cash) closely follows the time-series pattern 
of acquiring firms that report NOLCs. Collectively, my evidence indicates that tax-incentives are 




















Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I examine tax incentives in corporate acquisitions. In accordance with 
the Scholes-Wolfson framework, of “all taxes, all parties, and all costs”, a key insight in this 
dissertation is that the tax and non-tax attributes of the target and acquirer firm interact to determine 
the available tax incentive and thus the optimal level of tax-planning.  
 Using a sample of 1,028 domestic acquisitions by public U.S. firms, I examine tax 
incentives associated with the target firm’s net operating loss carryforward (NOLC). Empirically, 
I document a positive association between the target’s NOLC and acquisition premium that is 
increasing in the acquirer’s marginal tax rate. By doing so, I provide the first evidence that NOLC-
benefits are priced in corporate acquisitions under the tax rules in place following the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986.  
 Next, I document that the acquirer trades-off the net present value (NPV) of potential 
interest deductions against the NPV of the target’s NOLC. Empirically, I document that the 
conditional probability of financing the acquisition with debt is relatively lower in deals in which 
the target has an NOLC. This effect is stronger in deals in which the acquirer has a higher marginal 
tax rate. By documenting the substitutability of debt and non-debt tax shields in the structuring of 
corporate acquisitions, my findings provide new insight into how taxes affect optimal financing 
decisions.  
 Finally, I document that §382 of the Internal Revenue Code distorts investment incentives. 
§382 requires that the annual loss limit applicable on NOLCs post-acquisition be computed as of 
the date that the transaction closes. This creates uncertainty on the potential value of the NOLC 
because the applicable loss limit cannot be predicted accurately as of the date that the acquisition 
is announced. My empirical evidence suggests that a drop in the loss limit between the 
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announcement and closing dates increases the probability that the deal is canceled. To avoid the 
negative consequences of §382, the acquirer is forced to either time the closing of the deal to 
coincide with a favorable loss limit, or to incur additional costs associated with debt-issuance to 
offset the effect of the decrease in the value of the NOLC tax shield.  
 A second, and potentially costlier, unintended consequences of §382 is that it reduces the 
acquirer’s incentive to pay with stock. Stock consideration can potentially trigger an ownership 
change in the acquirer’s stock and thereby impose loss limitation rules on the acquirer’s NOLC. 
Empirically, I demonstrate that acquirers with NOLCs are less likely to pay with stock if there is 
potential for triggering an ownership change. Conditional on paying with stock, I find that deals 
are more likely to be cancelled if the loss limit drops between the announcement and closing dates. 
Finally, I show that the aggregate trend in the decline of all-stock deals and the corresponding rise 
in all-cash deals coincides with the increase in the percent of acquirers with NOLCs. This suggests 
that the §382 distortion on investment is potentially large.  
 In light of recent tax changes under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, my findings 
may be of interest to future studies examining tax incentives in corporate acquisitions. By reducing 
the statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, the TCJA reduced the value of all tax shields, 
both debt and non-debt. The TCJA further reduced the tax advantage of debt financing by limiting 
interest deductions to 30% of taxable income. In addition, the TCJA overhauled the NOL rules by 
eliminating carrybacks and allowing an indefinite carry-forward but limiting the deduction to 80% 
of taxable income. The recent passage of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
(CARES Act) has temporarily lifted the NOL restrictions and allows for NOLs to be carried back 
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Appendix A: The Tax Implications of the Structures Employed in the Acquisition of 
Freestanding C Corporations 
 
 Taxable Acquisitions Tax-Free Acquisitions 


























Yes Yes No No No 
Step-up in the 
tax basis of 
the target’s 
assets 




No No Yes3 Yes3 Yes3 
Immediate 
Levels of Tax 
Two Two One Deferred Deferred 
Frequency Rare Rare Common Common Common 
1Tax-free acquisitions provide gain deferral and are not really tax-free, but rather tax deferred. 
2Target tax attributes include net operating loss carry-forwards (NOLs), capital loss carry-
forwards, and various types of tax credits. 
3The target’s tax attributes are limited post-acquisition by §382. 
 








Appendix B: §382 Loss Limitation Rules 
If a corporate undergoes a significant ownership change, §382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits 
the amount of future income that can be offset by a pre ownership change net operating loss (NOL). 
Although the rules are complex, an ownership change is generally defined as any increase greater 
than 50 percentage points in the corporation’s stock over a three-year period by shareholders who 
own 5 percent for more of the corporation’s stock. If an ownership change is triggered, then the 
amount of taxable income that can be offset in each subsequent tax year is limited to the lesser of: 
1) the NOL, and 
2) the fair market value (MV) of the old loss corporation at the time of ownership change 
multiplied by the federal long-term tax-exempt rate (FLTR). 
 
If (𝑀𝑉𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅) < 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡, then the maximum amount of taxable income that can be 
offset in each of the 20 subsequent tax years is limited to (𝑀𝑉𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅) and the present value 
of the NOL to the acquirer is: 
𝑃𝑉(𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡) = (𝑀𝑉𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅) ∗ [
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−20
𝑟
] 
If (𝑀𝑉𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅) >= 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡, then there is no annual offset limit and the value of the NOL 





𝑀𝑉𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = fair market value of the target on the date of ownership change 
FLTR = federal long-term tax-exempt rate59 
NOL = net operating loss 





                                                          
58 Because the NOL is usually relatively immaterial in this case, I assume that the acquirer will fully use the NOL in 
the subsequent tax year.  
59 §382 requires the use of an adjusted rate which equals the highest FLTR for the three-calendar month period ending 
with the month of the ownership change. 
93 
 
Appendix C: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data Source 
   
Acquirer Characteristics  
Cash 
Cash holdings (che) scaled by acquirer’s market value (MV) 4 weeks 
prior to the initial acquisition announcement date 
che: Compustat 
MV: Thomson Reuters SDC 
D/E Ratio of total debt (dlc+dltt) to total debt plus equity (ceq) Compustat 
InstOwn Percent of stock held by institutions 
Thomson Reuters Institutional 
(13f) Holdings 
MTR 
Acquirer’s post-financing marginal tax rate (bcg_mtrint) computed as 
of the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the year of the 
acquisition announcement  
Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS) 
For further details, see Blouin, 
Core, and Guay (2010). 
PPE 




Total assets (at) plus market value of equity (prcc_f*csho) all scaled 
by total assets (at) 
Compustat 
R&D 
Research and Development Expense (xrd) scaled by acquirer’s market 
value (MV) 4 weeks prior to the initial announcement date 
Missing values of xrd are set to zero 
xrd: Compustat 
MV: Thomson Reuters SDC 
Rated 
Indicator equal to 1 if the acquirer has a Standard & Poor’s Domestic 
Long Term Issuer Credit Rating (splticrm) 
Compustat 
Return Stock return over the prior fiscal year 
The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
TLCF_d 
Indicator equal to 1 if the acquirer’s aggregate net operating loss 
carryforward is > 0; missing values are excluded 
Compustat 
TLCF_ln 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the acquirer’s aggregate net operating loss 
carryforward; missing values are excluded. 
Compustat 




Indicator equal to 1 if the target was subject to an Accounting and 




For further details, see Dechow, 
Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011). 
Accruals 
Discretionary accruals computed as the residual from the modified 
Jones Model.  
Compustat 
Analyst Natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm 
Institutional Brokers' Estimate 
System (IBES) 
Capex 
Capital Expenditures (capx) scaled by target’s market value (MV) 4 
weeks prior to the initial announcement date 
capx: Compustat 
MV: Thomson Reuters SDC 
EBITDA_SD 
Standard deviation of industry-adjusted (2-digit SIC) earnings before 
interest taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over the prior 
5 fiscal years 
Compustat 
Forecast_Error 
The natural logarithm of one plus the absolute value of the median 
consensus forecast scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings 
Institutional Brokers' Estimate 
System (IBES) 
InstOwn Percent of stock held by institutions 
Thomson Reuters Institutional 
(13f) Holdings 
Intangibles 
Intangible assets (intan) scaled by target’s market value (MV) 4 weeks 
prior to the initial acquisition announcement date 
Missing values of intan are set to zero 
Intan: Compustat 
MV: Thomson Reuters SDC 
 
Ln(MV) 
Natural logarithm of the target’s market value of equity as of the end 




% change in target’s market value between the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the year of the acquisition announcement and the 
date 4 weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement 
The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
NOLC 
Target’s federal net operating loss carryforward in $ millions 
10-K report available on 
EDGAR 
NOLC_d 
Indicator equal to 1 if target’s federal NOLC >0 
10-K report available on 
EDGAR 
NOLC_mv 
Target’s federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) scaled by 
target’s market value (MV) 4 weeks prior to the initial announcement 
date.  
NOLC: 10-K report available on 
EDGAR 




natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss 
carryforward (NOLC) 
10-K report available on 
EDGAR 
Q 
Total assets (at) plus market value of equity (prcc_f*csho) all scaled 
by total assets (at) 
Compustat 
R&D 
Research and Development Expense (xrd) scaled by target’s market 
value (MV) 4 weeks prior to the initial announcement date  
Missing values of xrd are set to zero 
xrd: Compustat 
MV: Thomson Reuters SDC 
Return Stock return over the prior fiscal year 
The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
VA 
Indicator equal to 1 if the target’s valuation allowance is greater than 
or equal to its federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) 
multiplied by the statutory federal corporate tax rate (35%) 
10-K report available on 
EDGAR 
Volatility Standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior fiscal year 
The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
Deal Characteristics  
>0% BankFin 
Indicator equal to 1 if (rel_loan_deal_amount + valbridge) > 0 
 
rel_loan_deal_amount = bank-issued debt ($ millions) 
valbridge = bridge loan ($ millions) 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
100% BankFin 
Indicator equal to 1 if [(rel_loan_deal_amount + valbridge)/eqval] >= 
100% 
 
rel_loan_deal_amount = bank-issued debt ($ millions) 
valbridge = bridge loan ($ millions) 
eqval = deal equity value ($ millions) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters SDC 
 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
Acquirer_382 
_Trigger 
Indicator equal to 1 if the estimated value of the stock consideration in 
the transaction is equal to at least 50% of the acquirer’s market value 
4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement 
 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
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The estimated value of stock consideration is computed as the percent 
of stock consideration (pct_stk) multiplied by the deal equity value 
(eqval).  
Acquirer_Δ382Limit 
The change in the acquirer’s §382 loss limit between the acquisition 
announcement and closing dates. Computed as: 
 
[(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) - (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal 
long-term tax-exempt rate and the acquirers market value as of the date 
on which the transaction closes. The closing date is the date on which 
the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 
𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition 
announcement date.  
The adjusted federal long-term tax exempt rate (FLTR), is equal to the 
highest FLTR over the current and prior two months. 
 
Market value: Thomson Reuters 
SDC 









Equal to Acquirer_Δ382Limit scaled by the acquirer’s announcement 
date §382 loss limit 




Indicator equal to 1 is deal consideration consists entirely of the 
acquirer’s stock. 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
BondFin 
Indicator equal to 1 if the acquirer issued bonds between the deal 
announcement and closing dates. The closing date is the date on which 
the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 
Mergent Fixed Income 
Securities Database (FISD) 
CAR3 
Three-day (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal acquisition announcement 
return estimated using the market model where the model parameters 
are estimated in the (−210, −60) window prior to the acquisition 
announcement 
The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
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CAR3 is computed for the acquiring (aCAR3) and the target (tCAR3) 
firm. 
CG 10-year change in the individual federal capital gains tax rate 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research  
http://www.nber.org/taxsim  
For further details, see Feenberg 
and Coutts (1993). 
Competition Indicator equal to 1 if there are multiple bidders Thomson Reuters SDC 
Completed 
Indicator equal to 1 if the deal is completed and 0 if the deal is 
withdrawn 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
Completed | month<=1 
Indicator equal to 1 if the deal closes in the same month as the month 
of the initial announcement date or in the subsequent month 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
Deal Size Natural logarithm of the deal equity value (eqval) ($ millions)  Thomson Reuters SDC 
Horizontal Deal 
Indicator equal to 1 if acquirer and target are not in the same industry 
(based on 2-digit SIC code) 
Compustat 
Hostile 
Indicator equal to 1 if deal attitude is hostile 
 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
Tender Indicator equal to 1 if deal if a tender offer Thomson Reuters SDC 
Pooling 
Indicator equal to 1 if the acquirer’s accounting treatment for the 
acquisition is the pooling method 
Compustat 
Premium 
(Offer Price – Closing Price)/Closing Price 
 
Closing Price is the target closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
initial acquisition announcement date 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
Relative Size 
Ratio of target market value to the sum of the target and acquirer 
market value 
Market values are computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial 
announcement date. 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
Taxable Indicator equal to 1 if at least 80% of the deal consideration is cash Thomson Reuters SDC 
Target_382Limit 
_AnnDate 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s §382 loss limit as of 4-weeks 
prior to the acquisition announcement date  
 
The §382 loss limit is computed as: 
Market value: Thomson Reuters 
SDC 





(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate 
and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the target’s market value. Both variables are 





The change in the §382 loss limit between the acquisition 
announcement and closing dates. Computed as: 
 
[(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) – 
 (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal 
long-term tax-exempt rate and the target’s market value as of the date 
on which the transaction closes, respectively. The closing date is the 
date on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 
𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are computed as of 4-weeks prior to the 
initial acquisition announcement date.  
Market value: Thomson Reuters 
SDC 




Target_Δ382Limit_d Indicator equal to 1 if Target_Δ382Limit is negative  
Target_Δ382Limit_% 














Targets’ Net Operating Loss Carryforward and Valuation Allowance 
Aggregated by Acquisition Announcement Year 
 
This figure presents the time-series plots of target firms’ net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) 
and valuation allowance (VA).  
The sample includes 1,022 acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 involving U.S. public 
acquirer and target firms. Two acquisitions, for which the target’s NOLC is greater than $2 billion, 
are excluded. These transactions are announced in years 2013 and 2016 and the target’s NOLC is 
$2.6 billion and $9.8 billion, respectively. 
 










Panel B: Mean NOLC and VA of target firms 
 
























Targets’ Net Operating Loss Carryforward and Acquisition Debt Financing 
Aggregated by Acquisition Announcement Year 
 
This figure presents the time-series plots of target firms’ net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) 
and acquisition debt financing.  
 
The sample includes 1,022 acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 involving U.S. public 
acquirer and target firms. Two acquisitions, for which the target’s NOLC is greater than $2 billion, 
are excluded. These transactions are announced in years 2013 and 2016 and the target’s NOLC is 
$2.6 billion and $9.8 billion, respectively.  
 
The dashed blue line depicts the % of Compustat listed firms with an aggregate NOLC conditional 










Figure 3: Predictive Margins 
 
Probability of Deal Completion  
Conditional on the Change in the Target’s §382 Loss Limit 
 
This figure corresponds with the regression coefficients reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9, 
estimated with the following probit model: 
Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_% + 
𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_% + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀 
Completed = 1 if the transaction is completed and 0 if it is withdrawn. 
NOLC_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward.  
Target_Δ382Limit_% = % change in the target firm’s §382 loss limit between the acquisition 
announcement and closing dates. It is computed as: 
 [(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒  ∗  𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)  −  (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒  ∗  𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒  ∗  𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and 
the target’s market value as of the date on which the transaction closes. The closing date is the date 
on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are 
computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement date.  
Marginal effects are computed as the partial derivative of the regression equation with respect to 
Target_Δ382Limit_% = (± 50%) conditioning on values of NOLC_ln.  
Panel A depicts the marginal effect for the regression reported in Table 9 column (3). The 
regression includes announcement year and target industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects.  
Panel B depicts the marginal effect for the regression reported in Table 9 column (4). The 











Panel A: Probability of Deal Completion Conditional on Target_Δ382Limit_d   
 





Figure 4: Predictive Margins 
 
Probability of Bond Issuance and Deal Completion  
Conditional on the Change in the Target’s §382 Loss Limit 
 
This figure corresponds with the regression coefficients reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
10. Coefficients from the two probit regressions are jointly estimated using a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) model that applies the generalized least squares estimator.  
Regression 1 models the probability that the acquirer issues bonds conditional on the size of the 
target’s federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) and the change in the Target’s §382 Loss 
Limit: 
Pr(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑛) = 𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝑍 + 𝜀 
Regression 2 models the probability that the acquirer completes the acquisition conditional on the 
size of the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) and the change in the Target’s 
§382 Loss Limit: 
Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛾7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀 
Both equations include main effects and lower order interactions. 
BondFin = 1 if the acquirer issues bonds between the acquisition announcement and closing date. 
The closing date is the date on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 
Completed = 1 if the transaction is completed and 0 if it is withdrawn. 
NOLC_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward. 
Target_Δ382Limit_d  = 1 if the change in the target’s §382 loss limit is negative. The change in 
the §382 loss limit is computed as: 
Target_Δ382Limit = [(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) - (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and 
the target’s market value as of the date on which the transaction closes. The closing date is the date 
on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are 
computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement date.  
In Panel A, the marginal effect is computed as the partial derivative of the regression (1) with 
respect to Target_Δ382Limit_d conditioning on values of NOLC_ln.  
In Panel B, the marginal effect is computed as the partial derivative of the regression (2) with 






Panel A: Probability of Bond Issuance Conditional on Target_Δ382Limit_d   
 





Figure 5: Predictive Margins 
 
Probability of Deal Completion  
Conditional on the Change in the Acquirer’s §382 Loss Limit 
 
This figure corresponds with the regression coefficients reported in column 2 of Table 13, 
estimated with the following probit model: 
Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑)
= 𝛼 + 𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_% ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_382_𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶
+ 𝜀 
The model includes main effects and lower order interactions. 
Completed = 1 if the transaction is completed and 0 if it is withdrawn. 
TLCF_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the acquirer’s aggregate net operating loss carryforward 
(Compustat variable: tlcf)). 
Acquirer_382_Trigger = 1 if the estimated value of the stock consideration in the deal is equal to 
at least 50% of the acquirer’s market value 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Acquirer_Δ382Limit_% = % change in the acquirer’s §382 loss limit between the acquisition 
announcement and closing dates. It is computed as: 
 [(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒  ∗  𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)  −  (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒  ∗  𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒  ∗  𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and 
the acquirer’s market value as of the date on which the transaction closes. The closing date is the 
date on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are 
computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement date.  
The marginal effect is computed as the partial derivative of the regression equation with respect to 
































Acquirers’ NOLC and Method of Payment  
Aggregated by Acquisition Announcement Year 
 
This figure presents the time-series plots of the % of acquiring firms with an aggregate net 
operating loss carryforward (NOLC) conditional on a non-missing NOLC value (Compustat 
variable: tlcf), and the % of acquisitions that are structured as either 100% stock-for-stock or 100% 
cash-for-stock. Deals with mixed payment are excluded.  
Panel A presents a time-series plot for 690 acquisitions in my sample that are announced between 
1995 and 2016 involving U.S. public acquirer and target firms.  
Panel B presents a time-series plot for 1,172 acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 
involving Canadian public acquirer and target firms.  
 




























Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
The sample includes 1,028 acquisitions involving U.S. public acquirers and targets announced between 1995 and 2016.  
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C. 
 
 Mean S.D. p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 
Acquirer Characteristics 
MTR 0.300 0.085 0.024 0.094 0.144 0.305 0.340 0.349 0.350 0.350 0.351 
Q 2.910 1.574 1.215 1.411 1.532 1.864 2.431 3.334 5.045 6.636 8.268 
Return 0.027 0.483 -0.943 -0.743 -0.625 -0.298 0.035 0.275 0.593 0.927 1.300 
Cash 0.131 0.188 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.025 0.067 0.167 0.309 0.428 1.147 
PPE 0.260 0.239 0.016 0.035 0.054 0.095 0.179 0.340 0.604 0.758 1.249 
D/E 0.291 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.258 0.432 0.647 0.782 1.204 
R&D 0.033 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.042 0.085 0.132 0.303 
InstOwn 0.643 0.253 0.023 0.141 0.269 0.485 0.690 0.832 0.924 0.984 1.091 
Target Characteristics 
NOLC ($ millions) 77 360 0 0 0 0 8 57 151 278 1003 
NOLC_mv 0.721 2.701 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.290 1.331 3.514 13.818 
NOLC_d 0.611 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VA ($ millions) 42 228 0 0 0 0 3 29 79 145 691 
VA 0.461 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Q 2.686 1.526 1.117 1.280 1.384 1.682 2.190 3.098 4.806 6.695 7.608 
Return -0.025 0.583 -0.982 -0.867 -0.726 -0.411 -0.066 0.263 0.635 1.050 2.149 
Volatility 0.170 0.108 0.042 0.062 0.072 0.097 0.140 0.211 0.302 0.390 0.584 
EBITDA_SD 0.112 0.151 0.008 0.015 0.021 0.032 0.061 0.118 0.254 0.402 0.894 
Intangibles 0.166 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.194 0.469 0.715 2.061 
Capex 0.067 0.115 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.030 0.070 0.144 0.252 0.752 
R&D 0.086 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.087 0.221 0.365 1.062 
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Accruals 0.007 0.123 -0.458 -0.214 -0.118 -0.034 0.005 0.058 0.137 0.202 0.396 
InstOwn 0.518 0.305 0.002 0.035 0.098 0.263 0.512 0.784 0.922 0.989 1.154 
Ln(MV) 5.470 1.834 1.312 2.482 3.124 4.221 5.475 6.729 7.773 8.509 9.825 
ΔMV 0.061 0.454 -0.775 -0.570 -0.428 -0.212 0.022 0.258 0.568 0.799 2.041 
Deal Characteristics 
Premium 0.469 0.423 -0.370 -0.053 0.065 0.214 0.392 0.622 0.966 1.312 2.087 
>0% BankFin 0.185 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
100% BankFin 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Tender 0.227 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Competition 0.061 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Horizontal Deal 0.664 0.472 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hostile 0.020 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Pooling 0.098 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Relative Size 0.172 0.177 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.027 0.110 0.269 0.438 0.527 0.677 
Deal Size 5.874 1.782 1.936 3.028 3.509 4.662 5.855 7.180 8.185 8.761 10.133 
Taxable 0.741 0.438 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CG -4.838 6.275 -13.140 -13.140 -13.140 -7.740 -6.810 -5.490 8.940 9.290 9.290 
aCAR3 (n = 946) -0.006 0.060 -0.123 -0.123 -0.095 -0.040 -0.003 0.026 0.069 0.110 0.122 














Baseline Test of Hypothesis 1  
Regressions on Acquisition Premium 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from the following OLS regression: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋 + 𝜀 
 
Premium = (Offer Price – Target’s Stock Price t-4weeks) / Target’s Stock Price t-4weeks. 
 
MTR = acquirer’s marginal tax rate simulated by Blouin et al. (2010). 
 
NOLC_mv = target’s federal net operating loss carryforward scaled by target’s market value 4 
weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. 
 
X is a vector of the determinants of acquisition premium. The vector includes announcement year 
by target industry (1-digit SIC) interactions. These coefficients are not reported. 
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive coefficient on 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣. 
 
In columns (2) and (3), regressions are reported on subsamples of deals conditional on the target 
firm’s valuation allowance (VA). VA = 1 if the target’s valuation allowance is greater than or equal 
to its federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) multiplied by the statutory federal corporate 
tax rate (35%). 
 
The sample includes 1,024 acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 involving U.S. public 
acquirer and target firms.  
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by target industry (2-digit SIC).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
± indicates one-tailed statistical significance at the 10% level if the sign of the coefficient is 
consistent with the prediction. 
 
Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the 





  VA = 1 VA = 0 
 (1) (2) (2) 
 Premium Premium Premium 
    
𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅 -0.061 0.121 -0.534* 
 (-0.29) (0.29) (-1.88) 
    
𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 -0.015 -0.006 -0.089** 
 (-0.49) (-0.17) (-2.61) 
    
𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑚𝑣 0.132± 0.092 0.615*** 
 (1.40) (0.79) (3.52) 
Acquirer Characteristics    
Q 0.023** 0.015 0.022** 
 (2.22) (0.76) (2.21) 
Return 0.066** 0.097 0.050* 
 (2.37) (1.20) (1.78) 
Cash -0.111 -0.139 -0.079 
 (-1.20) (-0.72) (-0.47) 
PPE -0.173** -0.061 -0.284*** 
 (-2.38) (-0.33) (-3.87) 
D/E 0.100 0.169 0.078 
 (1.41) (1.08) (1.00) 
R&D -0.244 -0.536 0.501 
 (-0.67) (-0.74) (1.00) 
InstOwn -0.115* -0.357** -0.035 
 (-1.78) (-2.43) (-0.54) 
Target Characteristics    
Q -0.002 0.052*** -0.026* 
 (-0.12) (3.64) (-1.92) 
Return 0.005 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.15) (-0.51) (-0.15) 
Volatility 0.391** 0.489** 0.588* 
 (2.53) (2.34) (1.88) 
EBITDA_SD -0.283*** -0.444*** -0.167 
 (-2.89) (-2.93) (-0.59) 
Intangibles 0.245*** 0.350*** 0.227** 
 (3.50) (3.64) (2.42) 
Capex 0.202 0.488 0.244 
 (1.16) (1.16) (1.07) 
R&D 0.468*** 0.623** -0.007 
 (3.32) (2.68) (-0.05) 
Accruals -0.121 -0.071 -0.038 
 (-0.82) (-0.34) (-0.31) 
InstOwn -0.139 -0.271 -0.119 
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 (-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.65) 
Deal Characteristics    
Tender 0.088** 0.124 0.086** 
 (2.29) (1.07) (2.53) 
Competition 0.038 0.132 -0.034 
 (0.83) (1.28) (-0.56) 
Horizontal Deal 0.006 0.043 0.001 
 (0.22) (0.77) (0.03) 
Hostile 0.091* 0.230*** 0.133 
 (1.82) (2.76) (1.56) 
Pooling 0.021 0.122 -0.012 
 (0.49) (0.97) (-0.21) 
Relative Size -0.407*** -0.569*** -0.317*** 
 (-5.00) (-3.56) (-3.12) 
Deal Size 0.029* 0.056*** 0.021 
 (1.83) (3.14) (1.07) 
Taxable 0.109 0.091 0.016 
 (1.63) (1.05) (0.13) 
Taxable * InstOwn -0.109 -0.155 -0.089 
 (-0.88) (-0.78) (-0.49) 
CG * InstOwn 0.023 0.012 0.008 
 (1.59) (0.53) (0.24) 
Taxable * CG 0.021* 0.008 0.007 
 (1.72) (0.50) (0.33) 
Taxable * CG * InstOwn -0.030* -0.012 -0.019 
 (-1.87) (-0.62) (-0.55) 
    
Constant 0.381*** 0.884*** 0.681* 
 (3.07) (4.61) (1.99) 
    
N 1,028 474 554 
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.339 0.138 
    
Marginal Effects  VA = 1 VA = 0 
dydx(NOLC_mv)  (1) (2) (3) 
at MTR Premium Premium Premium 
    
0% -0.015 -0.006 -0.089** 
 (-0.49) (-0.17) (-2.61) 
17.5% 0.008 0.010 0.018 
 (0.50) (0.63) (0.58) 
35% 0.031*** 0.026** 0.126*** 






Hypothesis 1 Sensitivity Test 1 
Regressions on Targets’ Market Value of Equity 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from cross-sectional OLS regression on the target’s market 
value.  
 
Column (1) estimates:  
 
ln(𝑀𝑉) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽𝑘𝑀 + 𝜀 
 
Column (2) estimates: 
 
𝛥𝑀𝑉 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑉𝐴 + 𝛽𝑘𝑀 + 𝜀 
 
Ln(MV) = natural logarithm of the target’s market value of equity as of the end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the year of the acquisition announcement.  
 
ΔMV = % change in target’s market value between the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to 
the year of the acquisition announcement and the date 4 weeks prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
 
NOLC_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward. 
 
VA = 1 if the target’s valuation allowance is greater than or equal to its federal net operating loss 
carryforward (NOLC) multiplied by the statutory federal corporate tax rate (35%). 
 
M is a vector of the determinants of market value. The vector includes announcement year and 
target industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. These coefficients are not reported.  
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
The sample includes 1,003 firms that are targets in acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 
involving U.S. public acquirer and target firms. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by target industry (2-digit SIC).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the 




   
 (1) (2) 
 ln(MV) ΔMV 
   
𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 0.109*** -0.017** 
 (2.82) (-2.18) 
   
𝛽2𝑉𝐴 -0.008 -0.018 
 (-0.05) (-0.37) 
   
𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑉𝐴 -0.105* 0.040** 
 (-1.89) (2.30) 
   
Return 0.028 0.099** 
 (0.38) (2.03) 
Volatility -1.174** 0.389 
 (-2.30) (1.50) 
EBITDA_SD 0.231 -0.190** 
 (1.47) (-2.38) 
Intangibles -0.018* 0.011*** 
 (-1.71) (6.31) 
Capex -1.197*** -0.420*** 
 (-2.97) (-4.01) 
R&D -0.678** -0.359*** 
 (-2.17) (-5.81) 
Accruals 0.053 -0.216** 
 (0.28) (-2.10) 
InstOwn 3.839*** -0.098 
 (18.39) (-1.62) 
   
Constant 3.469*** 0.466** 
 (10.85) (2.51) 
   
N 1,003 1,003 
Adjusted R2 0.592 0.131 
   
Marginal Effects   
   
dydx(VA)  (1) (2) 
at NOLC ($Millions) ln(MV) ΔMV 
   
$1 -0.081 0.010 
 (-0.53) (0.25) 
$10  -0.261** 0.077*** 
 (2.38) (3.42) 
$50 -0.422*** 0.138*** 
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 (-3.21) (4.12) 
$100  -0.494*** 0.165*** 
 (-3.17) (3.84) 
$500  -0.663*** 0.229*** 
 (-2.90) (3.36) 
$1000  -0.736*** 0.256*** 
 (-2.80) (3.22) 
$1500 -0.779*** 0.272*** 
 (-2.75) (3.16) 
$2000 -0.809*** 0.283*** 



























Hypothesis 1 Sensitivity Test 2 
Regressions on Acquisition Announcement Returns 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from regressions on acquisition announcement returns. The 
following OLS model is estimated: 
 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐶𝐴𝑅3) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋 + 𝜀 
 
CAR3 = three-day (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal return estimated using the market model where the 
model parameters are estimated in the (−210, −60) window prior to the acquisition announcement. 
CAR3 is computed for the acquiring (aCAR3) and the target (tCAR3) firm. 
 
MTR = acquirer’s marginal tax rate simulated by Blouin et al. (2010). 
 
NOLC_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward. 
 
X is a vector of the determinants of acquisition announcement returns. The vector includes 
announcement year by target industry (1-digit SIC) interactions. These coefficients are not 
reported. 
 
The model is estimated conditional on the target firm’s valuation allowance (VA). 
VA = 1 if the target’s valuation allowance is greater than or equal to its federal net operating loss 
carryforward (NOLC) multiplied by the statutory federal corporate tax rate (35%). 
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
The sample includes 946 acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 involving U.S. public 
acquirer and target firms. The sample is restricted to transactions for which CAR can be estimated 
for both the acquirer and the target firm. 
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by industry (2-digit SIC). Standard errors are cluster by target industry in columns 
(1) and (2) and by acquirer industry in columns (3) and (4).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the 





     
 VA = 1 VA = 1 VA = 0 VA = 0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ln(1+aCAR3) ln(1+tCAR3) ln(1+aCAR3) ln(1+tCAR3) 
     
𝛽1𝑀𝑇𝑅 0.060 0.087 0.085*** -0.404** 
 (0.69) (0.27) (4.56) (-3.69) 
     
𝛽2𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 -0.001 -0.010 0.008 -0.036*** 
 (-0.15) (-0.44) (0.70) (-5.92) 
     
𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 0.007 0.004 -0.034 0.081** 
 (0.63) (0.05) (-1.13) (3.66) 
Acquirer Characteristics     
Q -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 0.011 
 (-1.00) (-0.63) (-0.27) (1.76) 
Return 0.014*** 0.043*** 0.007 -0.012 
 (9.20) (4.16) (0.54) (-0.54) 
Cash -0.008 0.062 0.014 -0.117 
 (-0.13) (0.70) (0.89) (-1.59) 
PPE -0.011 0.008 0.020** -0.057 
 (-0.44) (0.10) (2.68) (-1.66) 
D/E 0.000 0.054 0.012 0.039 
 (0.02) (0.97) (1.13) (1.38) 
R&D -0.114 -0.346* -0.065 0.159 
 (-0.98) (-2.11) (-1.45) (0.52) 
InstOwn 0.007 -0.028 -0.030*** -0.047 
 (0.39) (-0.76) (-4.36) (-1.22) 
Target Characteristics     
Q -0.005 0.019** -0.004 -0.015* 
 (-1.83) (3.28) (-1.04) (-2.03) 
Return 0.005 -0.020 0.002 0.021 
 (1.33) (-1.72) (0.53) (1.80) 
Volatility -0.035 -0.008 0.009 0.220** 
 (-0.72) (-0.11) (0.14) (3.15) 
EBITDA_SD 0.047 -0.046 0.008 -0.097 
 (1.52) (-1.07) (0.41) (-0.64) 
Intangibles -0.015 0.095*** 0.008 0.116** 
 (-1.65) (3.74) (0.62) (3.49) 
Capex -0.015 0.088 -0.014 0.073 
 (-0.26) (0.79) (-0.47) (0.97) 
R&D -0.006 0.193** 0.076 0.005 
 (-0.26) (2.82) (1.54) (0.05) 
Accruals -0.028 0.065 -0.021 0.111** 
 (-1.80) (1.21) (-0.79) (2.48) 
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InstOwn -0.004 0.095 0.011 -0.046 
 (-0.18) (0.80) (0.39) (-0.83) 
Deal Characteristics     
Tender -0.007 0.064 0.020** 0.049* 
 (-0.56) (1.91) (2.52) (2.21) 
Competition 0.021 -0.143*** 0.019 -0.059 
 (1.19) (-4.16) (1.17) (-1.26) 
Horizontal Deal 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.13) (0.06) (0.43) (0.26) 
Hostile -0.050* 0.079 0.016 0.068* 
 (-2.07) (1.76) (0.64) (2.30) 
Pooling -0.024** 0.008 -0.006 0.033 
 (-3.35) (0.19) (-0.64) (1.41) 
Relative Size -0.001 -0.344** -0.048*** -0.201*** 
 (-0.02) (-3.39) (-4.56) (-5.44) 
Deal Size -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.78) (0.37) (-0.52) (0.18) 
Taxable 0.010 0.050 0.001 0.031 
 (0.30) (0.50) (0.11) (0.71) 
Taxable * InstOwn 0.033 -0.132 -0.001 0.036 
 (1.06) (-1.37) (-0.03) (0.51) 
CG * InstOwn 0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.010 
 (1.36) (0.68) (1.12) (-1.27) 
Taxable * CG 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.66) (-0.61) (-0.48) (-0.92) 
Taxable * CG * InstOwn -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.007 
 (-0.64) (0.51) (-0.42) (0.78) 
     
Constant 0.019 0.167* -0.013 0.311*** 
 (0.81) (2.02) (-0.46) (4.24) 
     
N 420 420 526 526 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.209 0.112 0.215 
     
Marginal Effects VA = 1 VA = 1 VA = 0 VA = 0 
dydx(NOLC_ln)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
at MTR aCAR3 tCAR3 aCAR3 tCAR3 
     
0% -0.0005 -0.010 0.0077 -0.0358*** 
 (-0.15) (-0.44) (0.70) (-5.92) 
17.5% 0.0007 -0.0094 0.0017 -0.0217*** 
 (0.41) (-1.05) (0.30) (-7.05) 
35% 0.0020* -0.0087 -0.0043*** -0.0076*** 






Baseline Test of Hypothesis 2 
Regressions on Acquisition Financing 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from regressions on acquisition financing. The baseline test, 
reported in column (1) is estimated with the following probit regression: 
 
Pr(> 0% 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑛) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝑅 +  𝛽𝑘𝑍 + 𝜀 
 
>0% BankFin = 1 if the deal is financed with any amount of bank debt. 
 
NOLC_d = 1 if the target has a federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC). 
 
MTR = acquirer’s marginal tax rate simulated by Blouin et al. (2010). 
 
Z is a vector of the determinants of acquisition financing. The vector includes announcement year 
by target industry (1-digit SIC) interactions. These coefficients are not reported. 
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative coefficient on 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑. 
 
The sample includes 1,024 acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2016 involving U.S. public 
acquirer and target firms.  
 
In column (2), the dependent variable 100% BankFin is equal to 1 if the transaction is 100% debt 
financed and 0 otherwise. 
In column (3), the dependent variable 100% BankFin is equal to 1 if the transaction is 100% debt 
financed and 0 if the transaction is financed 100% with internal cash. 
In column (4), the baseline regression is estimated with the interaction of NOLC_d and MTR. 
 
z-statistics (t-statistics) are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by acquirer industry (2-digit SIC).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Marginal effects are reported at the bottom of the table. In columns (1) - (3), the marginal effect is 
computed as the partial derivative of the regression equation with respect to NOLC_d. In column 
(4), the marginal effect is computed as the partial derivative of the regression equation with respect 





     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
𝑀𝑇𝑅 1.237 3.051** 0.259 1.954 
 (0.88) (2.21) (0.06) (1.18) 
     
𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 -0.403** -0.493*** -1.953*** -0.060 
 (-2.52) (-2.66) (-4.50) (-0.10) 
     
𝑀𝑇𝑅*𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑    -1.078 
    (-0.57) 
Acquirer Characteristics 
Q -0.026 -0.045 -0.042 -0.029 
 (-0.49) (-0.67) (-0.30) (-0.55) 
Return 0.001 -0.140 -0.336 0.012 
 (0.01) (-0.69) (-0.43) (0.07) 
Cash -0.379 -0.151 -4.439** -0.394 
 (-0.61) (-0.25) (-2.40) (-0.63) 
PPE 0.294 0.745** 3.426** 0.296 
 (0.93) (2.41) (2.22) (0.93) 
D/E 0.068 0.445 -0.273 0.063 
 (0.21) (1.08) (-0.31) (0.19) 
R&D 2.941 1.596 16.933** 2.957 
 (1.05) (1.00) (2.48) (1.04) 
InstOwn 0.231 -0.284 0.679 0.209 
 (0.69) (-0.58) (0.65) (0.59) 
Target Characteristics 
Q -0.089 -0.260*** 0.612** -0.088 
 (-1.26) (-2.88) (2.32) (-1.27) 
Return -0.008 -0.096 -0.779*** -0.014 
 (-0.06) (-0.51) (-3.02) (-0.10) 
Volatility -0.499 -1.787** -0.574 -0.507 
 (-0.42) (-2.29) (-0.10) (-0.43) 
EBITDA_sd -3.154* -0.962 1.588 -3.131* 
 (-1.68) (-0.72) (0.48) (-1.68) 
Intangibles 0.341 0.866*** 4.397*** 0.339 
 (1.05) (2.66) (2.98) (1.05) 
Capex 1.401* -0.022 6.153* 1.376* 
 (1.76) (-0.03) (1.81) (1.70) 
R&D -1.374 -0.052 6.077 -1.406 
 (-1.53) (-0.11) (1.21) (-1.53) 
Accruals 1.536** 1.295 0.483 1.541** 
 (2.34) (1.54) (0.44) (2.41) 
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InstOwn -4.363** -2.774** 1.367 -4.408** 
 (-2.42) (-2.55) (1.61) (-2.38) 
Deal Characteristics 
Tender 0.299* 0.171 -0.815*** 0.301* 
 (1.93) (0.65) (-2.61) (1.93) 
Competition -0.749*** -0.080 -1.584** -0.746*** 
 (-2.83) (-0.28) (-2.36) (-2.79) 
Horizontal Deal 0.692*** 0.766*** 0.626 0.692*** 
 (4.66) (3.64) (1.58) (4.65) 
Hostile -0.280 -0.758** -1.214 -0.274 
 (-0.54) (-2.25) (-1.19) (-0.53) 
Pooling -0.186 -0.453* -0.004 -0.193 
 (-0.54) (-1.76) (-0.00) (-0.56) 
Relative Size 3.072*** 1.222** 3.483* 3.082*** 
 (4.94) (2.19) (1.93) (4.96) 
Deal Size 0.238*** 0.026 -0.084 0.238*** 
 (3.40) (0.37) (-0.57) (3.40) 
Taxable 2.896*** -0.106  2.855*** 
 (3.77) (-0.16)  (3.64) 
Taxable * InstOwn 4.481** 2.996**  4.518** 
 (2.43) (2.37)  (2.41) 
CG * InstOwn -0.568* -0.039 0.097 -0.559* 
 (-1.74) (-0.27) (0.94) (-1.70) 
Taxable * CG -0.629*** -0.013  -0.621*** 
 (-2.79) (-0.13)  (-2.70) 
Taxable*CG*InstOwn 0.649** 0.089  0.639* 
 (2.00) (0.58)  (1.95) 
     
Constant -0.927 -2.373 -6.590*** -1.145 
 (-0.49) (-1.36) (-3.61) (-0.62) 
     
N 866 613 139 866 
Pseudo R2 0.451 0.366 0.450 0.451 
     
Marginal Effects     
 (1) (2) (3) (5) 








     
dydx(NOLC_d) -0.064** -0.068** -0.332***  
 (-2.49) (-2.83) (-5.80)  
dydx(MTR)     
(a) at MTR = 0% 0.154 0.041 0.229  
(b) at MTR = 35% 0.219 0.150 0.244  
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(b) – (a) 0.065 0.109*** 0.015  
 (0.96) (3.19) (0.06)  
     
dydx(NOLC_d)     
at MTR     
     
0%    -0.008 
    (-0.10) 
5%    -0.016 
    (-0.23) 
10%    -0.024 
    (-0.41) 
15%    -0.033 
    (-0.70) 
20%    -0.042 
    (-1.15) 
25%    -0.051* 
    (-1.86) 
30%    -0.061** 
    (-2.47) 
35%    -0.071** 




















Hypothesis 2 Sensitivity Test 1 
Regression on Acquisition Financing During the 2007-2009 Debt Crisis 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from the following OLS regression: 
 
> 0% 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 + ∑ 𝑌𝑄𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑑 ∗ ∑ 𝑌𝑄𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝛽𝑘𝑍 + 𝜀 
 
>0% BankFin = 1 if the transaction is financed with any amount of bank debt. 
 
NOLC_d = 1 if the target has a federal net operating loss carryforward. 
 
YQ = indexes quarterly periods for acquisitions announced between 2006 and 2009.  
The coefficients are estimated with respect to 2006 Q1 as the base.   
 
Z is a vector of the determinants of acquisition financing. These coefficients are not reported.  
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
The sample includes 176 acquisitions announced between 2006 and 2009 involving U.S. public 
acquirer and target firms. 
 
t-statistics are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by acquirer 
industry (1-digit SIC).  
 




















   
 >0% BankFin  
   
 Coefficient t-statistic 
   
NOLC_d 0.270 (1.80) 
   
2006 Q2 0.073 (0.42) 
2006 Q2 * NOLC_d 0.050 (0.16) 
   
2006 Q3 0.506** (2.67) 
2006 Q3 * NOLC_d -0.369 (-1.89) 
   
2006 Q4 0.207 (1.05) 
2006 Q4 * NOLC_d -0.193 (-0.74) 
   
2007 Q1 0.567** (2.94) 
2007 Q1 * NOLC_d -0.589** (-2.62) 
   
2007 Q2 -0.016 (-0.08) 
2007 Q2 * NOLC_d -0.029 (-0.13) 
   
2007 Q3 0.581* (2.26) 
2007 Q3 * NOLC_d -0.881** (-2.76) 
   
2007 Q4 0.549** (2.78) 
2007 Q4 * NOLC_d -0.698*** (-5.47) 
   
2008 Q1 0.520 (0.85) 
2008 Q1 * NOLC_d -1.103*** (-4.31) 
   
2008 Q2 -0.146 (-0.29) 
2008 Q2 * NOLC_d -0.463 (-1.40) 
   
2008 Q3 0.364 (0.86) 
2008 Q3 * NOLC_d -0.638* (-2.25) 
   
2008 Q4 -0.602 (-0.85) 
2008 Q4 * NOLC_d -0.125 (-0.72) 
   
2009 Q1 -0.519 (-0.86) 
2009 Q1 * NOLC_d - - 
   
2009 Q2 -0.618 (-0.82) 
2009 Q2 * NOLC_d 0.080 (0.16) 
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2009 Q3 -0.449 (-1.00) 
2009 Q3 * NOLC_d -0.015 (-0.13) 
   
2009 Q4 -0.547 (-1.12) 
2009 Q4 * NOLC_d 0.173 (0.51) 
   
Constant -0.933* (-2.04) 
   
N 176  



























Hypothesis 2 Sensitivity Test 2 
Acquirers’ Choice of Tax Shield Conditional on Acquirers’ Credit Rating 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from a regression on the acquirer’s choice between acquiring an 
NOLC target and obtaining debt financing via bank loan. The following probit model is estimated: 
 
Pr(𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑣𝑠𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑛) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝑍 + 𝜀 
 
NOLC_vs_BankFin = 1 if the target has a federal net operating loss carryforward (NOLC) and the 
acquirer does not obtain bank financing; and 0 if the target does not have an NOLC and the acquirer 
obtains bank financing.  
 
Rated = 1 if the acquirer has a Standard & Poor’s Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating 
(Compustat variable: splticrm). 
 
MTR = acquirer’s marginal tax rate simulated by Blouin et al. (2010). 
 
Z is a vector of the determinants of acquisition financing. Acquirer industry fixed effects (1-digit 
SIC) are included in columns (2) and (3).  
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
The sample includes 66 acquisitions announced in 2007 and 2008 involving U.S. public acquirer 
and target firms. Deals are removed from the sample if 1) the target has a federal NOLC and the 
acquirer obtains bank financing, or 2) the target does have a federal NOLC and the acquirer does 
not obtain bank financing. In 36 of the 66 deals, Rated = 1.  
 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by acquirer industry (1-digit SIC).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the 








    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 NOLC_vs_BankFin NOLC_vs_BankFin NOLC_vs_BankFin 
    
Rated 0.961*** 3.406*** -1.548 
 (5.63) (3.88) (-0.04) 
    
MTR -28.327*** -60.552 -70.075 
 (-3.05) (-0.89) (-0.53) 
    
MTR * Rated   14.496 
   (0.12) 
    
Q 0.075 0.042 0.063 
 (0.22) (0.09) (0.16) 
Return -1.828 -4.944** -4.938** 
 (-1.59) (-2.21) (-2.26) 
Cash 2.727*** 10.899*** 11.052*** 
 (3.78) (4.63) (4.27) 
PPE -1.864 -3.410 -3.496 
 (-1.32) (-1.02) (-1.10) 
D/E -1.924 -1.348 -1.303 
 (-1.26) (-1.01) (-1.16) 
R&D 0.389 1.676** 1.716** 
 (0.64) (2.00) (2.00) 
InstOwn -1.767 -2.089** -2.114** 
 (-1.31) (-2.27) (-2.06) 
Deal Size -0.365*** -0.885*** -0.878*** 
 (-2.95) (-4.36) (-4.15) 
    
Constant 13.597*** 24.482 27.682 
 (2.80) (1.06) (0.62) 
    
N 66 66 66 
Pseudo R2 0.412 0.586 0.586 
    
Marginal Effects    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 NOLC_vs_BankFin NOLC_vs_BankFin NOLC_vs_BankFin 
    
dydx(Rated) 0.175*** 0.440***  
 (5.05) (7.02)  
   
dydx(Rated)    
at MTR    
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30%   0.083 
   (0.36) 
33%   0.347 
   (1.45) 
34%   0.436*** 
   (5.80) 
35%   0.500*** 



























Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Additional Tests 
 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in empirical tests discussed in Chapter 7 and reported in Tables 9 through 11.  
 
The sample includes 489 acquisitions involving U.S. public acquirers and targets announced between 1995 and 2016.  
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C. 
 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Mean S.D. p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 
Acquirer Characteristics       
MTR 0.287 0.096 0.020 0.269 0.338 0.348 0.351 
Q 3.054 1.682 1.236 1.917 2.510 3.563 8.268 
PPE 0.247 0.239 0.014 0.081 0.159 0.318 1.353 
D/E 0.259 0.253 0.000 0.013 0.218 0.407 1.090 
Rated 0.483 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
InstOwn 0.628 0.251 0.024 0.457 0.669 0.828 1.067 
        
Target Characteristics        
NOLC ($ millions) 110.28 219.01 0.963 16.86 49.00 112.30 1482.00 
NOLC_ln 3.787 1.386 0.674 2.882 3.912 4.730 7.302 
Q 2.726 1.612 1.117 1.635 2.188 3.106 7.608 
Forecast_Error 0.913 1.032 0.000 0.000 0.547 1.514 4.047 
Analyst 2.243 1.521 0.000 0.693 2.565 3.401 4.977 
AAER 0.053 0.225 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Deal Characteristics        
Completed 0.883 0.321 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Target_382Limit_AnnDate 3.308 9.271 0.032 0.235 0.811 2.750 38.145 
Target_Δ382Limit_% 0.375 0.446 -0.414 0.120 0.313 0.536 2.316 
Target_Δ382Limit_d 0.162 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BondFin 0.092 0.289 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
>0% BankFin 0.121 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Month<=1 0.157 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AllStock 0.311 0.463 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
aCAR3 -0.012 0.086 -0.267 -0.046 -0.007 0.026 0.223 
tCAR3 0.267 0.303 -0.276 0.092 0.221 0.376 1.396 
Tender 0.241 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Competition 0.057 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Horizontal Deal 0.665 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hostile 0.016 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Pooling 0.096 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Relative Size 0.160 0.177 0.000 0.019 0.088 0.248 0.687 












Panel B: Statistics Tabulated by Deal Completion and Δ382Limit 
      
Completed  = 1 0 1 0 
Δ382Limit_Target_d  = 1 1 0 0 
      
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
          
Δ382Limit_Target_% * (-1)  -17 -13 -16 -10 48 37 43 30 
MTR (%)  22 27 21 20 30 34 29 33 
NOLC ($ millions)  89 58 75 64 105 48 221 46 
BankFin ($ millions)  202 0 238 0 273 0 368 0 
BondFin ($ millions)  179 0 76 0 172 0 6 0 
      
N  58 21 374 36 
 
Panel C: Cross-tabulation of BankFin and BondFin 
 
  BondFin (N)  
  0  1  
      
>0% BankFin (N) 
0 396  34 430 
     
     
1 48  11 459 
      
      







Probability of Deal Completion  
Conditional on the Change in the Target’s §382 Loss Limit 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from the following probit regression: 
 
Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 + 
𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀 
 
Completed = 1 if the transaction is completed and 0 if it is withdrawn. 
 
NOLC_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward.  
 
Target_Δ382Limit_d  = 1 if the change in the target’s §382 loss limit is negative.  
 
The change in the §382 loss limit is computed as: 
 
Target_Δ382Limit = [(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) - (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and 
the target’s market value as of the date on which the transaction closes. The closing date is the date 
on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are 
computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement date.  
 
C is a vector of the determinants of acquisition completion. Columns (1) and (3) include 
announcement year and target industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) include 
announcement year by target industry (1-digit SIC) interactions. These coefficients are not 
reported. 
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
The sample includes 489 acquisitions involving U.S. public acquirers and targets announced 
between 1995 and 2016. The sample is restricted to transactions in which the target’s NOLC is 
greater than the target’s offer date §382 loss limit (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒). 
 
In columns (3) and (4), Target_Δ382Limit_d is replaced with (Target_Δ382Limit_% *-1) which is 
equal to Target_Δ382Limit scaled by (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) and multiplied by negative one.  
 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by target industry (1-digit SIC).  
 





Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the 
regression equation with respect to Target_Δ382Limit_d conditioning on values of NOLC_ln. 














































     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Completed Completed Completed Completed 
     
NOLC_ln -0.046 -0.153** -0.222*** -0.432** 
 (-0.56) (-2.53) (-3.19) (-2.41) 
     
Target_Δ382Limit_d 0.068 0.664   
 (0.12) (0.65)   
     
NOLC_ln * Target_Δ382Limit_d -0.190 -0.462   
 (-1.47) (-1.60)   
     
(Target_Δ382Limit_% * -1)   0.306 1.659 
   (0.57) (1.27) 
     
NOLC_ln*(Target_Δ382Limit_% * -1)  -0.293** -0.636** 
   (-1.98) (-2.15) 
Acquirer Characteristics     
MTR 0.496 1.024 0.750 0.712 
 (0.44) (0.94) (0.62) (0.49) 
Q -0.051 -0.055 -0.047 -0.098*** 
 (-0.90) (-0.81) (-0.71) (-2.78) 
InstOwn -0.774 -1.409** -0.773 -1.033* 
 (-1.51) (-2.40) (-1.53) (-1.91) 
Target Characteristics     
Q 0.154* 0.268*** 0.213** 0.244*** 
 (1.88) (3.43) (2.40) (5.60) 
Forecast_Error -0.218*** -0.057 -0.208*** -0.077 
 (-3.17) (-0.38) (-2.80) (-0.46) 
Analyst 0.146* 0.063 0.112 0.109 
 (1.71) (0.31) (0.90) (0.59) 
AAER -0.782*** -1.237*** -0.749** -1.273*** 
 (-3.62) (-3.18) (-2.23) (-3.01) 
Deal Characteristics     
AllStock -0.385** -0.661* -0.438*** -0.773** 
 (-2.50) (-1.72) (-3.23) (-2.32) 
aCAR3 0.559 3.636*** 1.291 3.195*** 
 (0.83) (4.78) (1.39) (3.83) 
tCAR3 -0.033 -0.113 -0.179 -0.150 
 (-0.08) (-0.33) (-0.38) (-0.61) 
>0% BankFin 0.639*** 1.711*** 1.060*** 1.923*** 
 (2.75) (4.03) (5.62) (3.52) 
Tender -0.051 -0.197 -0.032 -0.314 
 (-0.27) (-0.43) (-0.13) (-0.79) 
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Competition -1.602*** -3.265*** -1.925*** -3.282*** 
 (-4.15) (-4.51) (-5.24) (-4.54) 
Horizontal Deal 0.086 0.399** 0.268 0.390* 
 (0.58) (2.23) (1.47) (1.68) 
Hostile -1.296 -2.862** -1.891* -2.763*** 
 (-1.15) (-2.52) (-1.78) (-2.63) 
Pooling 1.107** 1.646** 0.903* 1.575* 
 (1.99) (2.29) (1.82) (1.94) 
Relative_Size -2.374*** -3.438** -2.558*** -3.699** 
 (-3.02) (-2.36) (-2.63) (-2.24) 
Deal Size -0.221** -0.315** -0.253** -0.317** 
 (-2.49) (-2.56) (-2.38) (-2.31) 
     
Constant 3.299*** 2.780*** 7.056*** 3.302*** 
 (3.48) (9.24) (4.94) (3.32) 
     
N 489 277 489 277 
Pseudo R2 0.415 0.541 0.520 0.433 
     
Marginal Effects     
 (1) (2)   
dydx(Target_Δ382Limit_d) at  Completed Completed   
NOLC ($ millions)     
     
$10 -0.040 -0.048   
 (-1.42) (-1.15)   
$50  -0.077*** -0.148***   
 (-7.04) (-9.11)   
$100  -0.096*** -0.196***   
 (-7.33) (-5.14)   
$500  -0.144*** -0.303***   
 (-3.25) (3.69)   
$1000  -0.165*** -0.348***   
 (-2.75) (-3.50)   
$1500 -0.178** -0.374***   
 (-2.56) (-3.38)   
$2000 -0.187** -0.393***   







Probability of Bond Issuance and Deal Completion 
Conditional on the Change in the Target’s §382 Loss Limit 
 
This table reports the coefficients from the following probit regressions, which are estimated 
jointly using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model that applies the generalized least 
squares estimator: 
Pr(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑛) = 𝛼 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝑍 + 𝜀 
Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛾7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀 
Both equations include main effects and lower order interactions. 
BondFin = 1 if the acquirer issues bonds between the acquisition announcement and closing date. 
The closing date is the date on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 
Completed = 1 if the transaction is completed and 0 if it is withdrawn. 
NOLC_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward. 
Target_Δ382Limit_d = 1 if the change in the target’s §382 loss limit is negative.  
The change in the §382 loss limit is computed as: 
Target_Δ382Limit = [(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) - (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and 
the target’s market value as of the date on which the transaction closes. The closing date is the date 
on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are 
computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement date.  
Z and C are vectors of the determinants of acquisition financing and acquisition completion, 
respectively. Both vectors include announcement year and acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) fixed 
effects.  
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
The sample includes 489 acquisitions involving U.S. public acquirers and targets announced 
between 1995 and 2016. The sample is restricted to transactions in which the target’s NOLC is 
greater than the target’s announcement date §382 loss limit (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒). 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by target industry (1-digit SIC).  
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  




   
 (1) (2) 
 BondFin Completed 
   
NOLC_ln -0.135** -0.033 
 (-2.33) (-0.35) 
   
Target_Δ382Limit_d -3.017*** 0.956 
 (-5.73) (0.93) 
   
NOLC_ln * Target_Δ382Limit_d 0.642*** -0.401 
 (4.22) (-1.58) 
   
BondFin  -3.749*** 
  (-3.78) 
   
NOLC_ln * BondFin  1.645*** 
  (4.94) 
   
Target_Δ382Limit_d * BondFin  -64.425*** 
  (-8.61) 
   
NOLC_ln * Target_Δ382Limit_d * 
BondFin  17.347*** 
  (8.18) 
Acquirer Characteristics   
MTR 0.826 -0.129 
 (0.47) (-0.10) 
Rated -1.097** 0.456 
 (-2.22) (1.20) 
MTR * Rated 3.963*** -0.310 
 (4.38) (-0.15) 
PPE 1.125** 1.689 
 (2.48) (3.77) *** 
D/E 0.736** -0.959 
 (2.16) (-2.82) *** 
Q -0.133 -0.078 
 (-1.55) (-0.97) 
InstOwn 0.849** -0.473 
 (2.15) (-0.76) 
Target Characteristics   
Q 0.064*** 0.223*** 
 (3.19) (2.66) 
Forecast_Error 0.179*** -0.259*** 
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 (3.10) (-3.45) 
Analyst -0.079 0.146 
 (-0.66) (1.48) 
AAER -0.328 -0.876** 
 (-0.50) (-2.34) 
Deal Characteristics   
>0% BankFin 0.152 0.755** 
 (0.37) (2.40) 
AllStock 0.078 -0.148 
 (0.37) (-0.80) 
aCAR3 -1.606*** 1.252 
 (-2.81) (1.44) 
tCAR3 -0.330 0.156 
 (-0.79) (0.43) 
Tender -0.277 0.120 
 (-0.98) (0.76) 
Competition 0.145 -1.826*** 
 (0.35) (-3.46) 
Horizontal Deal 0.114 0.073 
 (0.40) (0.49) 
Hostile  -1.149 
  (-1.19) 
Pooling -0.629* 1.600*** 
 (-1.65) (4.81) 
Relative_Size -0.030 -2.815*** 
 (-0.04) (-2.61) 
Deal Size 0.258** -0.306** 
 (2.20) (-2.01) 
   
Constant -3.452*** 2.189* 
 (-2.81) (1.75) 
   
N 489 489 











Timing of Deal Closing 
Conditional on the Target’s Acquisition Announcement Date §382 Loss Limit 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from the following probit regression: 
 
Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑|𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ ≤ 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 
𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝐶_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀 
 
Completed | month ≤ 1 = 1 if the deal closes in the same month as the month of the initial 
announcement date or in the subsequent month. 
 
NOLC_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s federal net operating loss carryforward. 
 
Target_382limit_AnnDate = natural logarithm of 1 plus the target’s acquisition announcement date 
§382 loss limit. The loss limit is computed as: 
 
(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the 
target’s market value. Both are computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition 
announcement date.  
 
C is a vector of the determinants of acquisition completion. The vector includes announcement 
year and acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects. 
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C.  
 
The sample includes 419 acquisitions involving U.S. public acquirers and targets announced 
between 1995 and 2016. The sample is restricted to transactions in which the target’s NOLC is 
greater than the target’s announcement date §382 loss limit (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒), and for 
which there is sufficient within industry (1-digit SIC) and year variation in Completed | month<=1. 
 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by target industry (1-digit SIC). *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the 
















NOLC_ln * Target_382Limit_AnnDate 0.189*** 
 (2.66) 














































Pseudo R2 0.325 
  
Marginal Effects  
 (1) 
dydx(Target_382limit_AnnDate)  Completed | month<=1 




$50  -0.023 
 (-0.92) 
$100  -0.002 
 (-0.09) 
$500  0.048*** 
 (2.61) 



















Probability of Triggering an §382 Ownership Change  
Conditional on the Acquirer’s Tax Attributes 
 
 
This table reports the coefficients from the following probit regression: 
 
Pr (𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_382_𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹_𝑑 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋 + 𝜀 
 
Acquirer_382_Trigger = 1 if the estimated value of the stock consideration in the deal is equal to 
at least 50% of the acquirer’s market value 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. 
 
TLCF_d = 1 if the acquirer has an aggregate net operating loss carryforward (Compustat variable: 
tlcf). 
 
Z is a vector of the determinants of acquisition financing. Column (1) includes announcement year 
and acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) fixed effects. Column (2) includes announcement year by 
acquirer industry (1-digit SIC) interactions. These coefficients are not reported. 
 
The sample includes 500 acquisitions involving U.S. public acquirers and targets announced 
between 1995 and 2016. The sample is restricted to transactions in which the acquirer’s aggregate 
net operating loss as reported in Compustat is non-missing. TLCF_d is equal to 1 in 319 deals and 
0 in 181 deals.  
 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by acquirer industry (1-digit SIC).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the 











   
 (1) (2) 
 Acquirer_382_Trigger Acquirer_382_Trigger 
   
TLCF_d -0.517** -2.968*** 
 (-2.14) (-4.48) 
Acquirer Characteristics   
MTR -6.690*** -22.310*** 
 (-7.33) (-5.41) 
Q 0.065 0.874** 
 (1.01) (2.11) 
Return -0.600** -4.589*** 
 (-2.57) (-3.19) 
Cash 1.155* 5.800 
 (1.79) (1.58) 
PPE -1.502** -2.392* 
 (-2.26) (-1.81) 
D/E 0.366 -0.861 
 (0.86) (-0.84) 
R&D 9.967*** 52.668*** 
 (6.55) (3.59) 
InstOwn 0.557 2.403** 
 (0.75) (2.52) 
Target Characteristics   
NOLC_d 0.497*** 1.374** 
 (2.89) (2.04) 
Q -0.034 -0.633 
 (-0.90) (-1.62) 
Return -0.166 1.970** 
 (-0.59) (2.05) 
Volatility -1.622 -6.876** 
 (-0.98) (-2.52) 
EBITDA_SD -1.540*** -6.018*** 
 (-4.74) (-2.81) 
Intangibles 0.859* 7.703*** 
 (1.79) (6.93) 
Capex -2.001 -26.161*** 
 (-1.29) (-2.99) 
R&D -6.212*** -29.407*** 
 (-5.55) (-3.14) 
Accruals -2.384* -14.384*** 
 (-1.73) (-3.37) 
InstOwn -2.087*** -12.901* 
 (-2.89) (-1.94) 
Deal Characteristics   
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Tender - 1.390** 
  (2.27) 
Competition 0.537 -2.141*** 
 (1.18) (-2.82) 
Horizontal Deal -0.036 - 
 (-0.16)  
Hostile - 0.289 
  (0.69) 
Pooling 0.272 30.682*** 
 (0.89) (3.45) 
Relative Size 9.943*** 0.982** 
 (8.02) (2.08) 
Deal Size 0.330*** -12.127** 
 (3.00) (-2.24) 
Taxable -2.941*** 1.390** 
 (-5.68) (2.27) 
Taxable * InstOwn 0.123 5.884 
 (0.16) (1.38) 
CG * InstOwn -0.015 -0.494 
 (-0.40) (-1.13) 
Taxable * CG 0.016 0.115 
 (0.40) (0.89) 
Taxable * CG * InstOwn -0.186*** -0.433*** 
 (-2.93) (-5.15) 
   
Constant 43.394 65.358 
 (0.44) (0.74) 
   
N 500 317 
Pseudo R2 0.665 0.834 
   
Marginal Effects   
 (1) (2) 
 Acquirer_382_Trigger Acquirer_382_Trigger 
   
dydx(TLCF_d) -0.040** -0.152*** 
 (-1.99) (-4.86) 









Probability of Deal Completion  
Conditional on the Change in the Acquirer’s §382 Loss Limit 
This table reports the coefficients from the following probit regression: 
 
Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹_𝑙𝑛 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝛥382𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_382_𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶 + 𝜀 
 
The model includes main effects and lower order interactions. 
 
Completed = 1 if the transaction is completed and 0 if it is withdrawn. 
 
TLCF_ln = natural logarithm of 1 plus the acquirer’s aggregate net operating loss carryforward (Compustat variable: tlcf)). 
 
Acquirer_382_Trigger = 1 if the estimated value of the stock consideration in the deal is equal to at least 50% of the acquirer’s market 
value 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. 
 
Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d = 1 if the change in the acquirer’s §382 loss limit is negative. The change in the acquirer’s §382 loss limit is 
computed as: 
Acquirer_Δ382Limit = [(𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) - (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒)] 
 
Where 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑀𝑉𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are the adjusted federal long-term tax-exempt rate and the acquirer’s market value as of the 
date on which the transaction closes. The closing date is the date on which the transaction is either completed or withdrawn. 𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 
and 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 are computed as of 4-weeks prior to the initial acquisition announcement date.  
 
C is a vector of the determinants of acquisition completion. The vector includes announcement year and acquirer industry (1-digit 
SIC) fixed effects. These coefficients are not reported. 
 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Appendix C. 
The sample includes 295 acquisitions involving U.S. public acquirers and targets announced between 1995 and 2016. The sample is 
restricted to transactions in which TLCF is non-missing and TLCF is greater than the acquirer’s announcement date §382 loss limit 




In column (2), Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d is replaced with (Acquirer_Δ382Limit_% *-1) which is equal to Acquirer_Δ382Limit scaled by 
the acquirer’s announcement date §382 loss limit (𝐹𝐿𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 * 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑛𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒) and multiplied by negative one.  
 
z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by acquirer industry 
(1-digit SIC).  
 
*, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Marginal effects, reported at the bottom of the table, are computed as the partial derivative of the regression equation with respect to 
Acquirer_382_Trigger conditioning on values of Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d and TLCF_ln. Marginal effects for the regression reported in 
















   
 (1) (2) 
 Completed Completed 
   
TLCF_ln -0.318 0.346*** 
 (-1.47) (4.46) 
   
Acquirer_382_Trigger -0.879 0.161 
 (-0.67) (0.10) 
   
TLCF_ln * Acquirer_382_Trigger 0.188 -0.083 
 (0.71) (-0.26) 
   
Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d -7.920***  
 (-4.38)  
   
TLCF_ln * Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d 1.048***  
 (3.46)  
   
Acquirer_382_Trigger * Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d 2.057  
 (1.14)  
   
TLCF_ln * Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d * Acquirer_382_Trigger -0.630  
 (-1.40)  
   
(Acquirer_Δ382Limit_% * -1)  -7.150* 
  (-1.81) 
   
TLCF_ln * (Acquirer_Δ382Limit_% *-1)  0.723 
  (1.17) 
   
Acquirer_382_Trigger * (Acquirer_Δ382Limit_% *-1)  6.240** 
  (2.02) 
151 
 
   
TLCF_ln * (Acquirer_Δ382Limit_% *-1) * Acquirer_382_Trigger  -1.223* 
  (-1.89) 
   
Acquirer Characteristics   
MTR 5.249** 3.208* 
 (1.96) (1.72) 
Q 0.037 0.036 
 (0.38) (0.35) 
InstOwn -2.308*** -1.343 
 (-3.85) (-1.39) 
Target Characteristics   
Q -0.039 -0.059 
 (-0.44) (-0.68) 
Forecast_Error -0.324*** -0.068 
 (-3.04) (-0.56) 
Analyst 0.059 -0.152 
 (0.47) (-0.83) 
AAER -1.731*** -1.663*** 
 (-6.36) (-4.47) 
Deal Characteristics   
aCAR3 -2.162 -1.197 
 (-1.53) (-0.83) 
tCAR3 0.127 -0.266 
 (0.15) (-0.32) 
>0% BankFin 2.730*** 2.740*** 
 (3.88) (2.93) 
Tender -0.223 -0.359 
 (-0.31) (-0.52) 
Competition -1.349*** -0.909** 
 (-3.46) (-2.47) 
Horizontal Deal 0.507 0.357 
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 (1.36) (0.76) 
Hostile -4.654*** -5.309*** 
 (-7.16) (-4.35) 
Pooling 1.745* 1.702** 
 (1.90) (2.50) 
Relative_Size -3.362** -4.451** 
 (-2.57) (-2.23) 
Deal Size -0.401*** -0.277** 
 (-3.00) (-2.43) 
   
Constant 6.237*** 0.934 
 (2.74) (0.65) 
   
N 295 295 
Pseudo R2 0.640 0.621 
   
Marginal Effects   
 (1)  
 Completed  
dydx(Acquirer_382_Trigger) Acquirer_Δ382Limit_d =   
at TLCF ($ millions) = 1 0  
    
$10 0.021 -0.006  
 (0.16) (-0.51)  
$50  -0.086 -0.003  
 (-1.09) (-0.22)  
$100  -0.113* -0.0003  
 (-1.70) (-0.02)  
$500  -0.130** 0.011  
 (-2.06) (0.36)  
$1000  -0.128** 0.018  
 (-2.04) (0.43)  
$1500 -0.125** 0.022  
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 (-2.02) (0.46)  
$2000 -0.122** 0.026  
 (-2.00) (0.48)  
 
 
